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I. INTRODUCTION
For many, the name 1qbal identifies a famous Pakistani poet and
philosopher. In Arabic, the name Iqbal means one who is fortunate or
wealthy. In several cultures, the naming of a child is a sacred act and
celebrated event. Such cultures associate a name's meaning to the
qualities and characteristics shared by the child named. By extension,
one might assume that one who is named Iqbal will enjoy great
prosperity and riches. The legal and human journey for a man named
Javaid Iqbal proved to be quite different.
Javaid Iqbal is a native and citizen of Pakistan and a Muslim. After
moving to the United States, Iqbal worked as a cable television installer
on Long Island. Iqbal was one among hundreds of men apprehended and
detained by the United States Department of Justice in the weeks that
followed the September 11, 2001 attacks. Iqbal was held in a federal
prison in Brooklyn, New York called the Metropolitan Detention Center
(MDC), for more than one year.' In January 2002, Iqbal was transferred
to the maximum security section of the jail known as the Administrative
Maximum Special Housing Unit (ADMAX SHU).2 Following his
deportation to Pakistan, Iqbal filed a federal lawsuit in the District Court
1. First Amended Complaint, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-1809, 2004 WL
3756442 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004).
2. Id.
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for the Eastern District of New York against several federal government
officials, including the former Attorney General John Ashcroft and the
former head of Federal Bureau for Investigations Robert S. Mueller III,
claiming that they were responsible for the abuses he suffered while at
MDC.' While at MDC, Iqbal alleged that he suffered the following
abuses "numerous instances of excessive force and verbal abuse,
unlawful strip and body cavity-searches, the denial of medical treatment,
the denial of adequate nutrition, extended detention in solitary
confinement, the denial of adequate exercise, and deliberate interference
with [his] rights to counsel and to exercise of [his] sincere religious
beliefs," among other things.4 Iqbal alleged that he was singled out for
mistreatment based on race, religion and national origin and also
"subjected to a pattern and practice of cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment in violation of the United States Constitution, federal statutory
law, and customary international law."s
Over the government's objections that Iqbal's legal claim was
insufficiently stated and that in any event they were entitled to "qualified
immunity" both the district court and the Second Court of Appeals found
that Iqbal's allegations were adequate.6 Notably, the Second Circuit
held:
[M]ost of the rights that [Iqbal] contends were violated do not vary
with surrounding circumstances, such as the right not to be subjected
to needlessly harsh conditions of confinement, the right to be free
from the use of excessive force, and the right not to be subjected to
ethnic or religious discrimination. The strength of our system of
constitutional rights derives from the steadfast protection of those
rights in both normal and unusual times.7
Thereafter, former Solicitor General Paul Clement filed the
government's petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court arguing
that among other reasons, Iqbal's allegations lacked the specificity
required by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, an antitrust case decided by the
Court in 2007.8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in lqbal, and in
reversing the Second Circuit, concluded that Iqbal failed to allege a
3. See Complaint, Elmaghraby, No. 04-1809 (E.D.N.Y. May 3, 2004) 2004 L
3756439; see also First Amended Complaint, Elmaghraby, No. 04-1809, 2004 WL
3756442 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004).
4. Elmaghraby, No. 04-1809, 2004 WL 3756442 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004).
5. Id.
6. See Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-1809, 2005 WL 2375202, at *18
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005); Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 164 (2d Cir. 2007).
7. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 159.
8. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-
1015), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2007/2pet/7pet/2007-1015.pet.
aa.pdf; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
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"plausible" link between the officials' conduct and the abuses he said he
had suffered. Specifically, the Court found that under Twombly, Iqbal's
complaint "has not nudged his claims of invidious discrimination across
the line from conceivable to plausible."9 Writing for the majority, Justice
Anthony Kennedy remarked:
The September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab Muslim
hijackers who counted themselves members in good standing of al
Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist group. Al Qaeda was headed by
another Arab Muslim-Osama bin Laden-and composed in large
part of his Arab Muslim disciples. It should come as no surprise that
a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain
individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks would
produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even thouph
the purpose of the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims.
Since the Supreme Court's decision was handed down on May 18,
2009, there has been a flurry of news articles, trade journals, blogs, law
reviews and even proposed legislation responding to the striking impact
of Iqbal on the future of the notice pleading standard." Characterizing
9. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, at 1951 (2009). To reach this conclusion, the
Court summarized Twombly's interpretation of the Rule 8 standard: 1) the principle that a
court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions; 2) only a complaint that states a plausible claim survives a motion to
dismiss. As to the allegations specified in Iqbal's complaint, that Mueller and Ashcroft
"knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [him] to harsh
conditions of confinement "as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race,
and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest," the Court found these
and related allegations to be merely conclusory and not entitled to being accepted as true.
As to Iqbal's factual allegations that Ashcroft and Mueller "arrested and detained
thousands of Arab Muslim men . .. as part of its investigation of the events of September
11" and "the policy of holding post-September- 11 "' detainees in highly restrictive
conditions of confinement until they were cleared by the FBI was approved by
Defendants Ashcroft and Mueller," the Court relied on possible alternative explanations,
to conclude that discrimination was not a plausible conclusion. Interestingly, the Court
utilized an immigration "alternative" to conclude that Iqbal's arrest and detention were
nondiscriminatory. "On the facts respondent alleges the arrests Mueller oversaw were
likely lawful and justified by his nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who were
illegally present in the United States and who had potential connections to those who
committed terrorist acts. As between that "obvious alternative explanation" for the
arrests, [citing Twombly], and the purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent asks us
to infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion." Id. at 1952.
10. Syllabus, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, at 1941 (2009) (No. 07-1015). The Supreme Court
sent the case back to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether Iqbal
should have the opportunity to modify his complaint to provide more information about
the defendants' discriminatory intent and involvement. On July 28, 2009, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the district court to decide the same.
Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 574 F. 3d 820 (2d.Cir. July 28, 2009).
11. According to the New York Times, within the first two months of the Court's
decision, Iqbal was cited to more than 500 times by the lower courts. Adam Liptak, 9/11
1488 [Vol. 114:4
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Twombly as a "Rule 8 plus" standard, law professor Anthony Renzo
argues that since the new standard requires a level of specification that
only the government possesses the effect of the Iqbal decision is that
plaintiffs are paralyzed from seeking judicial remedies when senior level
government officials have breached the Constitution.12
This Article draws attention to the role of immigration in Iqbal, and
argues that far from creating a new standard in the immigration realm,
the Iqbal decision perpetuates a longstanding "Business As Usual"
standard that permits the federal government to create and sustain laws
that selectively discriminate against foreign nationals during times of
national security, with minimal accountability. More specifically, the
"Business As Usual" standard can be defined by the sum of the Article's
parts, namely 1) an overreaching set of laws adopted by Executive and/or
Legislative branch during times of national security; 2) a tangible set of
harms falling on particular foreign nationals as a consequence of these
laws; 3) blanket permission to the government to sustain such laws
without any evidence of improved national security or stated benefits;
4) less than successful attempts by government ombudsmen to
ameliorate the above-stated harms; and 5) extreme deference by the
courts to the "political branches" in recognition of the plenary power
doctrine.
Part II of this Article places Iqbal in the larger context of how
immigration law and policy was made and applied in the aftermath of
September 11, 2001.13 This Part describes the Federal government's
design for arresting and detaining "special interest" detainees in
connection with the events of September 11, 2001, and the related
procedural defects and concerns of mistreatment documented by the
Case Could Bring Broad Shift on Civil Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/us/ 2 1bar.html; see also Dawinder S. Sidhu, First
Korematsu and Now Ashcroft v. lqbal: The Latest Chapter in the Wartime Supreme
Court's Disregard for Claims of Discrimination, 58 BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract--1478787 ("[A] Westlaw search conducted on
September 21, 2009, containing the Supreme Court reporter citation to Iqbal, yielded
1,789 hits in the federal case database."); Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, I11 Cong. 4 (2009) (statement of Rep. Henry C. Johnson,
Jr., Member, Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties) ("[Slince
the Iqbal decision earlier this year over 1,600 district and appellate court cases have been
thrown out due to insufficient pleadings, and that is just totally unacceptable to the
notions of fair play and substantial justice that was [sic] imbedded into my memory
during law school.").
12. Posting of Anthony F. Renzo to American Constitution Society, A Law-Free
Zonefor All the King's Men, http://acslaw.org/node/13479 (May 28, 2009, 15:57 EST).
13. In many places throughout this article the terms "aftermath of September 11,
2001," "post 9-11 policies," "9-11 policies" and "policies issued after 9/11'" are used
interchangeably.
14892010]
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Inspector General. This Part also summarizes a handful of national
security policies enacted after 9/11 that at best, had a disproportionate
impact on foreign nationals from countries with Muslim-majority
populations and at worst, selectively discriminated and targeted
nationalities and religions for extra scrutiny without basic safeguards or
due process.
Part III shows how many of the policies described in Part II
continue to impact individuals and families nine years later. For
example, this Part highlights how the special registration program has
caused many Arab and Muslim applicants to be denied an immigration
benefit or relief based on noncompliance with a component of the
registration program. This Part also describes and critiques how many of
the policies that originated on a "national security" premise have been
recast and sustained as broad immigration enforcement tools.
Part IV of the Article describes the government's efforts to mitigate
some of the harms emanating from many post 9-11 policies.
Specifically, this Part describes the multiple public offices, complaint
mechanisms, and initiatives established in the Executive Branch to
combat 9/11 discrimination. This Part also examines related legislative
and to a smaller scale, judicial efforts to redress the overreach of many
9/11 policies described in Part II.
In Part V, the Article discusses whether the impact of 9/11 policies
resulted in quantifiable improvements to national security to argue that
many of these policies were made with minimum accountability on the
creators of such policies. This Part argues that many if not most of the
policies identified in Part II have not been shown to have advanced
national security and instead have resulted in substantial harms to the
Arab and Muslim community.
Part VI of the Article describes the plenary power doctrine and the
judiciary's historical deference to discriminatory immigration laws
created by the political branches, especially during times of national
security. It also describes the high standard imposed by the judiciary for
establishing selective prosecution claims. This Part analyzes how these
high standards enabled the Executive Branch to institute otherwise
discriminatory policies and practices following 9/11. In this way, the
Article shows how the pleading standard created by Iqbal bears a sharp
resemblance to how the courts have treated selective discrimination
claims in immigration matters, especially during times of national
security.
Recognizing the forces of the Business As Usual Standard, the
Article offers some recommendations to the Executive, Legislative and
Judicial branches moving forward.
1490 [Vol. 114:4
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II. CONTINUING IMPACT OF POST 9-11 IMMIGRATION PRACTICES
A. PENTBOTTM Detentions and OIG Detainee Report
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, federal agencies
responsible for national security and immigration enforcement targeted
noncitizens from Arab, Muslim and South Asian countries.14  The
Department of Justice's Federal Bureau of Investigations launched a
major domestic investigation known as the Pentagon/Twin Towers
Bombing Investigation or PENTBOTTM. In October, former Attorney
General John Ashcroft spoke at a conference to the U.S. Mayors,
analogizing former Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy's belief that
arresting mobsters for "spitting on the sidewalk" would help thwart
organized crime, to the zealousness with which potential "terrorists" in
the September 11, 2001 should be punished.15 Ashcroft remarked:
Let the terrorists among us be warned: If you overstay your visa-
even by one day-we will arrest you. If you violate a local law, you
will be put in jail and kept in custody as long as possible. We will
use every available statute. We will seek every prosecutorial
advantage. We will use all our weapons within the law and under the
Constitution to protect life and enhance security for America.16
One of the principal tactics used by the United States government
after the September 11 attacks was to use existing and new immigration
directives to arrest and detain noncitizens with possible ties to terrorism.
Many concerns raised by advocacy groups, individual complaints, and
the news media in the months following September 11, were documented
in a related government report issued by the Department of Justice's
Inspector General (OIG Detainee Report).' 7  The specific number of
noncitizens detained in connection with the PENTBOTTM investigation
is unknown. According to the OIG Detainee Report, "the Public Affairs
Office stopped reporting the cumulative totals after the number reached
approximately 1,200, because the statistics became confusing." 8 While
14. Throughout this article, the terms "Arab, Muslim and South Asian" "Arab and
Muslim" and "Muslim-majority" will be used interchangeably, unless otherwise noted.
15. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW
OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS, at ch. 2 § I(B) (2003) (hereinafter OIG,
THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/.
16. Id. at 2 § I(B).
17. Id. According to the OIG Detainee Report "Based on this assessment by the
FBI, "high interest detainees" were sent to BOP high-security facilities, while "of
interest" and "interest unknown" detainees generally were housed in less restrictive
facilities, such as county jails under contract to the INS." Id. at ch. 2 § V.
18. Id. at ch. I n.2.
2010] 1491
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many detainees were released without any criminal or civil charges after
being questioned, a meaningful number were arrested and detained on
civil immigration violations.19 In this way and beyond Ashcroft's vow to
use every law on the books to go after suspected terrorists, he in fact
used every law on the books to go after individuals (i.e., undocumented
noncitizens) who were not even suspected of terrorism. The OIG
Detainee Report found that 762 of these individuals classified by the FBI
as "of interest," "of high interest" or of "undetermined interest" were
detained pursuant to the PENTBOTTM investigation, and placed on a
special "INS Custody List" because the FBI assessed that they may have
ties to terrorism or because the FBI did not have enough information to
make this determination. 2 0  The investigations focused on males from
Muslim-majority countries. According to the OIG Detainee Report,
"The September 11 detainees were citizens of more than 20 countries.
The largest number, 254 or 33 percent, came from Pakistan, more than
double the number of any other country. The second largest number
(111) came from Egypt. Nine detainees were from Iran and six from
Afghanistan." 21
While the government held these detainees in a variety of
correctional facilities, the OIG review focused on two facilities where a
majority of the detainees (approx. 475) were held and related complaints
were filed: The Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) and the Passaic
County Jail (Passaic).22 MDC is located in Brooklyn, New York and
operated by the Department of Justice's Bureau of Prisons (BOP). MDC
is a 9-story structure that holds men and women who have either been
convicted of a criminal offense or who are awaiting a trial or
sentencing.23 Passaic is a county jail located in Paterson, New Jersey.
The OIG sampled 119 detainees and focused its review on issues
affecting the length of the detainees' confinement, including: 1) the
process undertaken by the FBI and others to clear individual detainees of
19. Id at ch. 1. According to the New York Times, "Mr. Iqbal was arrested in his
Long Island apartment on Nov. 2 by agents who were apparently following a tip about
false identification cards. In his apartment they found a Time magazine showing the
World Trade Center towers in flames and paperwork showing that he had been in Lower
Manhattan on Sept. 11, picking up a work permit from immigration services." Nina
Bernstein, U.S. Is Settling Detainee's Suit in 9/11 Sweep, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/28/nyregion/28detain.html?page
wanted=1&_r=1.
20. OIG, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES, supra note 15, at ch. 1 § II.
21. Id. at ch. 1 § II.
22. Id. at ch. 1 § II.
23. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF SEPTEMBER 11
DETAINEES' ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE AT THE METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER IN
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK 2 (December 2003) (hereinafter OIG, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT),
available at http://trac.syr.edu/immigrationlibrary/P29.pdf
1492 [Vol. 114:4
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a connection to the September 11 attacks or terrorism in general; 2) bond
determinations for detainees; 3) the removal process and the timing of
removal; and 4) conditions of confinement experienced by detainees,
including their access to legal counsel.2 4
Recognizing the challenges faced by the Department of Justice and
components in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the OIG
nevertheless identified a number of concerns with the policies the
Department of Justice implemented as part of the PENTBOTTM
investigation, including, but not limited to: the slow pace of the
Department's "hold until cleared" policy and related lack of resources; 2 5
the delay in INS's timely service of charges to detainees with timely
Notices to Appear; 26 the little to no evidence on which INS relied to
oppose bond set by Immigration Judges for detainees who were not yet
cleared by the FBI;27 the BOP's initial communications blackout and its
policy of permitting detainees one legal call per week (and specifically
how a legal call was calculated); 28 serious delays between the time FBI
communicated to BOP that a detainee had been cleared of terrorism and
the time in which BOP notified MDC of such clearance; 29 a "pattern of
physical and verbal abuse" by some MDC staff, among other findings. 30
B. OIG MDC Report
In December 2003, the Department of Justice's OIG published a
supplemental report on the allegations of detainee abuse at MDC
following September 11, 2001 (MDC Report).3 1  The MDC Report
summarizes the classification and procedures in place for PENTBOTTM
detainees, noting that some of these detainees were confined to a special
housing unit, where they remained in their cells for at least 23 hours per
day.32 Whereas most of the MDC staff members interviewed by the OIG
stated that they always behaved professionally towards the 9/11
detainees, the OIG found that several MDC staff violated BOP policy by
verbally and physically abusing some of the 9/11 detainees.33 The MDC
24. OIG, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES, supra note 15, at ch. 1 II (a detailed
methodology can be found here).
25. Id. at ch. 4 § I.
26. Id. at ch. 3.
27. Id. at ch. 5.
28. Id. at ch. 7 § V.
29. Id. at ch. 7 § IV(B).
30. Id. at ch. 7 § VI.
31. OIG, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 23.
32. Id. at 3.
33. Id. at 8. The OIG defined "physical abuse" as "the handling of detainees in ways
that physically hurt or injure them without serving any correctional purpose." The OIG
2010] 1493
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Report concluded that the following allegations of physical abuse took
place at MDC: 1) slamming, bouncing, and ramming detainees against
walls; 3 4 2) bending or twisting detainees' arms, hands, wrists, and
fingers;"5 3) lifting restrained detainees off the ground by their arms, and
pulling their arms and handcuffs;36 4) stepping on detainees' leg restraint
chains;37 5) using restraints improperly;38 and 6) handling detainees in an
otherwise rough or inappropriate manner.3 9 Based on statements from
MDC staff, witnesses outside of MDC, and select videotapes, the OIG
concluded that several detainees were also verbally abused by MDC
staff.40 In one interview between the OIG and a lieutenant at MDC, the
lieutenant remarked that when select detainees requested for more food,
some MDC staff would reply "[y]ou're not getting shit because you
killed all those people."4 1 Similarly, some of the detainees alleged that
they were threatened with statements such as:
Whatever you did at the World Trade Center, we will do to you.
You're never going to be able to see your family again.
If you don't obey the rules, I'm going to make your life hell.
You're never going to leave here.
You're goin to die here just like the people in the World Trade
Center died.
The MDC Report also identifies a number of operational issues at
MDC relating to the treatment of PENTBOTTM detainees, building
upon the OIG Detainee Report's findings of:
problems with detainees receiving timely access to counsel, detainees
being held under extremely harsh conditions of confinement such as
cells being lighted 24 hours a day, detainees being held in lockdown
for at least 23 hours a day, detainees being placed in full restraints
every time they were moved, and detainees not receiving adequate
recreational opportunities.43
defined "verbal abuse" to mean "insults, coarse language, and threats to physically harm
or inappropriately punish detainees." See id.
34. Id. at 11-16.
35. Id. at 16-18.
36. Id. at 18-19.
37. Id. at 20-22.
38. Id. at 22-25.
39. Id. at 26-28.
40. Id. at 28-30.
41. Id. at 29.
42. Id. at 28.
43. Id. at 30-31.
[Vol. 114:41494
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Specifically, the MDC Report highlights how MDC staff placed
detainees' faces or heads against a t-shirt bearing an American flag and
the phrase "These colors do not run" to send a message; how meetings
between attorneys and MDC detainees were improperly audio recorded,
thereby limiting communications between attorney and client and
chilling detainees from alleging misconduct or abuse; how MDC staff
strip searched detainees excessively; how MDC staff banged on the cell
doors of detainees while they were sleeping; and how MDC delayed
releasing a significant number of videotapes to the OIG."
While many of the practices documented by the OIG might be
criticized by civil liberties advocates and scholars in any context, it is
indisputable that these policies impacted primarily Muslim male
populations. Also significant was the government's reliance on general
and often racially and ethnically based tips and leads to determine who
should be arrested and labeled as "special interest." 4 5
C. Turkmen Lawsuit
One significant lawsuit that followed the PENTBOTTM detentions
was Turkmen v. Ashcroft, a class action brought by the Center for
Constitutional Rights (CCR) on behalf of several males who were
detained at MDC in connection with the PENTBOTTM investigation.4 6
Spanning more than 100 pages, an amended complaint filed with the
federal court in the Eastern District of New York in 2006 details the
alleged mistreatment suffered by the named plaintiffs, summarizes the
OIG reports detailing the abusive practices and conditions at MDC, and
among other things alleges that "[b]y subjecting Plaintiffs and class
members to excessive force, unreasonable and excessively harsh and
inhumane conditions, and penalizing them for the practice of their faith,
the Defendants in this action have intentionally and/or recklessly violated
44. See id. at 31-43. Once the OIG reviewed the previously held videotapes, they
found that some of the MDC staff members interviewed "engaged in the very conduct
they specifically denied in their interviews." Id. at 42.
45. See, e.g,, OIG, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES, supra note 15, at ch. 2 § II.
For the most part, the 762 aliens classified as September 11 detainees were
arrested by FBI-led terrorism task forces pursuing investigative leads and were
held on valid immigration charges. These leads ranged from information
obtained from searches of the hijackers' cars and personal effects to
anonymous tips called in by members of the public suspicious of Arab and
Muslim neighbors who kept odd schedules .... PENTTBOTTM leads that
resulted in the arrest of a September 11 detainee often were quite general in
nature, such as a landlord reporting suspicious activity by an Arab tenant.
Id. at ch. 2 § 11.
46. Third Amended Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Turkmen v.
Ashcroft, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95913 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 02-CV-2307 (JG)),
available at http://www.ccrjustice.org/files/Turkmen_3rdAmendedComplaint_09_04.pdf.
14952010]
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rights guaranteed to Plaintiffs and class members under the First, Fourth,
and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and under
customary international law and treaty law."47 Responding to a motion
to dismiss filed by the defendants, Judge John Gleeson dismissed the
plaintiffs' claims related to prolonged detention but permitted the
plaintiffs challenges on the conditions of confinement and racial and
religious discrimination to ensue.4 8 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld Judge Gleeson's dismissal about the plaintiffs allegations of
prolonged detention, vacated a portion of the district court's decision and
remanded the entire case to the district court to entertain an amended
complaint by the plaintiffs and to consider the complaint under the new
pleading standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal.49
On October 31, 2008, the plaintiffs in Turkmen filed an amicus brief
in Iqbal, analogizing the mistreatment and abuse suffered by the
plaintiffs in Turkmen and Iqbal at the hands of former FBI Director
Mueller and former Attorney General Ashcroft, and opposing a special
pleading standard for higher ranking officials.o Expressing their
opposition to a higher pleading standard, amici noted:
Petitioners maintain that the protection of a vaguely defined class of
"higher ranking officials" from "frivolous lawsuits" requires a special
rule available to no other defendant or potential defendant .... At
issue here is not a small or local operation, in which it is plausible to
suppose the heads of the Department Justice and the FBI had no role,
but a massive, nationwide program in which petitioners played a
prominent, part. Press conferences and public speeches by
petitioners regarding the 9/11 investigation as it proceeded are noted
in the April 2004 report of the Justice Department's Office of the
Inspector General. Meetings and conversations of other Department
of Justice and FBI officials are scattered throughout that report; to
suppose that all of this activity took place without the participation of
petitioners strains the imagination.51
47. Id. at T 3. For a description and timeline of Turkmen from the date on which the
original complaint was filed in 2002 to date, see Center for Constitutional Rights,
Turkmen v. Ashcroft, http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/turkmen-v.-ashcroft.
48. Center for Constitutional Rights, supra note 47.
49. Posting of Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 06-3745 to http://blogs.findlaw.com/
secondscircuit/2009/12/turkmen-v-ashcroft-no-06-3745.html (Dec. 21, 2009, 15:59
EST); Center for Constitutional Rights, supra note 48.
50. Motion for Leave to File Brief for Amici Curiae Ibrahim Turkmen et al. in
Support of Respondent Javaid Iqbal, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-
1015), available at http://www.ccrjustice.org/files/IqbalAmicus_0.pdf.
51. Id. at 1-3. On November 3, 2009, CCR announced that five plaintiffs held at
MDC following the September 11, 2001 attacks had reached a settlement with the
govemment for $1.26 million. According to the one of the plaintiffs who settled, Yasser
Ebrahim:
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While the OIG reports and Turkmen lawsuit were limited to the
treatment of select "special interest" detainees picked up in the
immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the Executive Branch and
the Department of Justice in particular implemented a number of policy
changes targeted at individuals from Muslim-majority countries.
Dubbed as national security measures, many of these changes made
specific amendments to immigration policies and laws and included
1) codifying a broader time period during which an officer may bring
charges against any apprehended noncitizen; 2) requiring certain
immigration court hearings to be "closed" to the media, public and
family members of the defendant; 3) deploying immigration officers to
arrest, detain and remove individuals from particular nationalities who
are identified in a database as having been ordered removed; 4) soliciting
individuals of particular nationalities for "voluntary" interviews with the
FBI; 5) requiring men from 25 select countries to "register" with their
local immigration office and follow related "exit and entry"
requirements; and 6) other discriminatory acts. Some of these policies
were country specific meaning that the government intentionally
solicited individuals from particular countries to participate in special
programs. Other directives were facially neutral, but were applied to a
specific population based on religion, ethnicity, nationality, age, and/or
gender. Each of these changes is discussed in turn below.
D. 48 Hour Rule
In September 2001, the Department Justice promulgated a new
regulation enabling officers to make charging decisions within 48 hours
of an individual's arrest or detention.5 2 The regulation allows a charging
decision to be prolonged for longer than 48 hours for "an additional
reasonable period of time" in cases that present an "emergency or other
extraordinary circumstance."53 The regulation does not define
"emergency or other extraordinary circumstance" nor does it interpret
We were deprived of our rights and abused simply because of our religion and
the color of our skin. After seven long years, I am relieved to be able to try to
rebuild my life. I know that I and others are still affected by what happened
and that communities in the U.S. continue to feel the fallout. I sincerely hope
this will never happen again.
Center for Constitutional Rights, Five New York Men Detained and Abused in Post-9/11
Immigration Sweeps Settle Case for $1.26 Million, Nov. 3, 2009,
http://www.ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/five-new-york-men-detained-and-
abused-post-9/1 1-immigration-sweeps-settle-ca.
52. Custody Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. 48331 (Sept. 20, 2001); Disposition of Cases
of Aliens Arrested without Warrant, 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2010).
53. Custody Procedures, supra note 52; Disposition of Cases of Aliens Arrested
without Warrant, supra note 52.
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what constitutes "an additional reasonable period of time." Similarly, the
regulation does not contain a timeframe for when a noncitizen should be
served with notice of his charges or a Notice to Appear (NTA), nor does
it explicate when the NTA should be filed with the immigration court.
The OIG Detainee report concluded that approximately 192 special
interest detainees were served NTAs more than 72 hours following their
arrest and that 5 of these detainees waited approximately 168 days to be
served. 54
The absence of a legal timeframe for serving the NTA to an
individual or court creates a great liberty cost to detained individuals, as
many are unable to see a judge until the NTA is filed with the court and a
hearing has been scheduled. The regulations confirm that removal
proceedings are triggered only when the NTA is filed with the
immigration court. In theory, such filing is followed by the court's
scheduling of a preliminary "arraignment" hearing known as the "master
calendar" hearing.5 7 While it is technically possible for an immigration
detainee to request for release from custody to an immigration judge
without being issued an NTA, 8 the likelihood that she will have
knowledge of this technicality is low. Because immigration removal
proceedings are considered to be "civil," respondents are not guaranteed
court-appointed counsel as in the criminal system. Practically speaking
this means that 84 percent of immigration detainees proceed with the
removal process without counsel and in some cases with severe cultural,
language, and educational barriers. 59 Against this backdrop, it is difficult
to imagine that immigration detainees would be informed about their
ability to request for release. Moreover, permitting the government to
hold a person in custody for prolonged periods without an NTA raises
serious due process concerns. The NTA contains critical information
regarding the noncitizen's immigration charges, court date, ability to
secure counsel at his own expense, change of address requirements, and
54. OIG, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES, supra note 15, at ch. 3, §§ I(B), III(A).
55. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Policy and Politics of Immigrant Rights, 16
TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 387, 407-08 (2007); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Under
Arrest: Immigrants'Rights and the Rule ofLaw, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 853, 866 (2008).
56. Jurisdiction and Commencement of Proceedings, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14 (2009).
57. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF IMMIGRATION JUDGE, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE
MANUAL 64-70 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vIl/OCIJPracManuall
Chap%204.pdf.
58. Custody/Bond, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (2009).
59. ABA COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 7
(2010), available at http://new.abanet.org/Immigration/Documents/Reformingthe
ImmigrationSystemExecutiveSummary.pdf; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, JAILED
WITHOUT JUSTICE: IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE USA 4 (2009), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/uploads/JailedWithoutJusticeExecutiveSummary.pdf.
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other information.o Without an NTA, a detained noncitizen is left in the
dark, preventing him from accessing counsel, or even understanding the
nature of his custody or charges.
E. Closed Hearings
On September 21, 2001, the former Chief Immigration Judge
Michael Creppy issued a memorandum to all the immigration judges and
court administrators (Creppy Memo), instructing them to close certain
immigration cases to the public and to "avoid discussing the case or
otherwise discussing any information about the case to anyone outside of
the Immigration Court."61 The Creppy Memo specified that selected
cases should be separated from all other cases on the docket, and closed
to visitors, press, and family.62 By May 8, 2009, the Department of
Justice confirmed 641 immigration cases were closed pursuant to the
Creppy Memo. The vast majority of closed cases involved Arab and
Muslim men. The Creppy Memo raised a number of constitutional
questions including, but not limited to, First Amendment protections. 4
F Alien Absconder Initiative
On January 25, 2002, the former Deputy Attorney General issued
guidance on the "Alien Absconder Initiative" (AAI). 6 5 While the stated
purpose of the AAI was to locate more than 300,000 individuals with
unexecuted removal orders, the government focused its resources on the
nearly 6000 men from largely Muslim and Arab countries.6 6 While
60. Immigration and Nationality Act [INA] § 239, 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2009).
61. Memorandum from Michael Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, to all
Immigration Judges and Court Administrators (Sept. 21, 2001) available at
http://www.cnss.org/creppy%20memo.pdf; see also Stephen H. Legomsky, The Ethnic
and Religious Profiling of Noncitizens: National Security and International Human
Rights, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 161, 174 (2005) [hereinafter Legomsky, Ethnic and
Religious Profiling]; N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir.
2002) (quoting the Memorandum from Michael Creppy supra).
62. Memorandum from Michael Creppy, supra note 61.
63. Legomsky, Ethnic and Religious Profiling, supra note 61 (citing to testimony of
Kevin Rooney, Director of EOIR, before Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security,
and Claims, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives).
64. See, e.g., N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 203; Detroit Free Press v.
Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 710-11 (6th Cir. 2002). See also Mary-Rose Papandrea, Under
Attack: The Public's Right to Know and the War on Terror, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 35
(2005).
65. Memorandum from Larry Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, to the INS
Commissioner, the FBI Director, the US Marshals Service Director, and US Attorneys
(Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dojabscndr
012502mem.pdf
66. JEANNE A. BUTTERFIELD, AM. IMMIGRATION LAW FOUND., EXECUTIVE BRANCH
ACTIONs (2002), http://www.ailf.org/lac/lacotherresources-execbranchactions.asp;
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operation of a program premised on immigration enforcement and
focused on individuals ordered removed might not be inherently
objectionably, what is problematic was the government's selective
application of the AAI to nationals from Muslim-majority countries
based on national security grounds. Scholars have classified the
government's selective enforcement of these men as racial profiling,
highlighting the fact that while the vast majority of so called
"absconders" came primarily from Latin America, the government's
targeting of the slice of men from Muslim-majority countries was
discriminatory.6 8 While the AAI became somewhat neutralized with
ICE's independent creation of a National Fugitive Operation Program in
2003, the agency's initial focus on individuals from particular religions
and nationalities is striking. 69 According to the 2002 memo, INS officers
are also required to enter identified "absconders" into the National Crime
and Information Center (NCIC), a national database utilized daily by
state and local law enforcement; apprehend and interview such
absconders; and prosecute or remove such individuals. 70 The theory
behind placing "absconders" into the NCIC is that local police officers
can notify INS (now ICE) when such individuals are identified.7 1 While
the legal and policy concerns raised by placing largely civil information
into the NCIC database are many, the author highlights here the
government's targeted civil data of particular minority groups for
insertion into the NCIC following September 11, 2001.
Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security After
September 11, and the Future of North American Integration, 91 MINN. L. REv. 1369,
1370 (2007). See Kevin Lapp, Pressing Public Necessity: The Unconstitutionality of the
Absconder Apprehension Initiative, 29 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 573, 573-76
(2005); Karen C. Tumlin, Comment, Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy Is Reshaping
Immigration Policy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1173, 1190-93 (2004).
67. See infra Part V.
68. Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1575, 1579-80
(2002); Arvin Lugay, Book Review: "In Defense of Internment": Why Some Americans
Are More "Equal" than Others, 12 ASIAN L.J. 209, 228 (2005).
69. MARGOT MENDELSON, SHAYNA STROM & MICHAEL WISHNIE, MIGRATION POLICY
INST., COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AN EXAMINATION OF ICE's FUGITIVE OPERATIONS
PROGRAM 19-20 (2009), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/
NFOP Feb09.pdf.
70. Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General to the Commissioner of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Director of the United States Marshal Service & United States Attorneys (Jan. 25, 2002),
available at http://tinyurl.com/2bka4gy.
71. See, e.g., Michael Ramage, Fla. Dep't of Law Enforcement Gen. Counsel,
Remarks at the International Association of Chiefs of Police Legal Officers Annual
Meeting (Nov. 14, 2004), transcript available at http://www.aele.org/ramage2004.html.
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G. Voluntary Interview Program
In 2001, the Department of Justice instituted a "voluntary"
interviewing program "to interview aliens whose characteristics were
similar to those responsible for the attacks" whose purpose was to
"determine what knowledge the aliens might have of terrorists and
terrorist activities."72 By March 2003, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) reported that 3,216 noncitizens were interviewed in two
phases of the program.73 Interview questions included birthplace and
country of citizenship; contact information for the noncitizen and his or
her family members; education and employment; the noncitizen's foreign
travel, involvement in armed conflicts, reaction to terrorism, and
knowledge of terrorism or any criminal activity. 74 The GAO noted that
while interviewees were not forced into participating in the interviews,
"they worried about repercussions, such as future INS [DHS] denials for
visa extensions or permanent residency, if they refused to be
interviewed."7  Moreover, attorneys and advocates in three districts told
GAO that "interviewed aliens told them they felt they were being singled
out and investigated because of their ethnicity or religious beliefs."
In 2003, DOJ instituted a second interviewing program with
thousands of Iraqis with the purpose of gathering counterterrorism
information and intelligence.n While the former Attorney General
lauded the information gathered from the Iraqi community, legal scholars
and members of the community criticized the FBI's use of profiling.
Legal scholar and Georgetown law professor David Cole commented
"So we've got now suspicion predicated only on national origin
72. GAO, JUSTICE DEPARTMENTS PROJECT TO INTERVIEW ALIENS AFTER SEPTEMBER
11, 2001 1 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03459.pdf [hereinafter
GAO REPORT].
73. See id. at 8; American Immigration Lawyers Association, Boiling the Frog
Slowly: Executive Branch Actions Since September 11, 2001, 7 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL.
1236, 1236-44 (2002); The Aftermath of September 11: A Chronology, 79 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1359, 1360 (Nov. 9, 2002). The questions were pre-formulated and are
reproduced in the GAO REPORT, supra note 72, at 21-27 (2003).
74. GAO REPORT, supra note 72, at 21-27.
75. Id. at 5; see also Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General, to All U.S.
Attorneys and All Members of Anti-Terrorism Task Forces (Nov. 9, 2001), available at
http://www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom/terrorism2.htm.
76. GAO REPORT, supra note 72, at 16.
77. Hearing before the Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary Subcommittee of the
Senate Appropriations Committee, 108'h Cong. (2003) (statement of John Ashcroft, Att'y
Gen. of the United States), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/testimony/
2003/040103appropstestimony.htm.
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extending to U.S. citizens .... That's exactly what we had during
World War II with Japanese Americans.
H. Special Registration
In September 2002, former Attorney General John Ashcroft rolled
out a tracking program known as "special registration." Formally called
the "National Security Entry and Exit Registration System" or NSEERS,
the program was rolled out in multiple phases, beginning first with
visiting nonimmigrants from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria.79 Such
individuals were required to register at the port of entry (POE) at which
they entered, follow up with an in-person interview between day 30 and
day 40 from the date of entry, and register again upon exiting the United
States.so Individuals who failed to comply with the NSEERS program
were placed into the NCIC to enable local enforcement officials to
apprehend such individuals.8 1 The NSEERS program was expanded to
include a "call-in" component to reach certain males who had already
82
entered the United States. The announcement of and instructions for
call-in registration was made through four publications in the Federal
Register.83 In sum, select males from 25 countries were solicited for
call-in registration.84  Information collected and interview questions
included bank account information, credit card information, and
affiliations with political, religious, or social groups on university
78. Pierre Thomas, FBI Mounts Intense Iraqi-American Probe, ABC NEWS, Mar. 25,
2003, http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=90744&page=1.
79. Press Release, DOJ, Attorney General Ashcroft Announces Implementation of
the First Phase of the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (Aug, 12, 2002),
available at-http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2002/August/02_ag_466.htm.
80. Registration and Monitoring of Certain Nonimmigrants, 67 Fed. Reg 52584
(Aug. 12, 2002). See also Registration and Fingerprinting, 8 C.F.R. § 264.1(f) (2008).
81. See The FBI's National Crime Information Center: Hearing Before the S.
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Citizenship, S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Michael D. Kirkpatrick, Assistant Dir. in Charge,
Criminal Justice Info. Serv. Div.) available at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress03/
ncic 1 1303.htm.
82. See Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated Countries, 68
Fed. Reg. 2363 (Jan. 16, 2003); Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from
Designated Countries, 67 Fed. Reg. 77642 (Dec. 18, 2002); Registration of Certain
Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated Countries, 67 Fed. Reg. 70526 (Nov. 22, 2002);
Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated Countries, 67 Fed. Reg.
67766 (Nov. 6, 2002) (the four Federal Register publications in this footnote will
hereinafter be referred to collectively as the Federal Register Publications). Under § 263
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C § 1303 (2006), the Attorney General is
authorized to prescribe special registrations and forms for the registration and
fingerprinting of special groups of nonimmigrants.
83. See Federal Register Publications, supra note 82.
84. See id.
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campuses.85  The men targeted for call-in registration came from the
following countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Afghanistan,
Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar,
Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, and Kuwait.16  The NSEERS
program was riddled with problems ranging from a lack of resources for
the government to actually implement the program, to feelings of
besiegement by the Muslim, Arab, and South Asian communities for
being singled out as potential threats to national security. Moreover,
thousands of compliant registrants were detained upon registration,
placed in removal proceedings, and removed from the United States.88 In
December 2003, the DOJ issued an interim rule "suspending" select89portions of the NSEERS program. In particular, the agency lifted the
30-40 day interview requirement for POE registrants, and the annual re-
registration requirements applicable to all special registrants.90 The
interim rule also halted the call-in registration program, while still
maintaining the agency's ability to institute domestic registration in the
future and interview individuals on a case-by-case basis.9 1  The
suspension rule not only created the false impression that NSEERS was
85. Jane Black, At Justice NSEERS Spells Data Chaos, BUSINESSWEEK, May 2, 2003
available at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/may2003/tc200305 2
6532 tc073.htm.
86. See Federal Register Publications, supra note 82; see also AM.-ARAB ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION COMM. & CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS, PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV.,
NSEERS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA'S EFFORTS TO SECURE ITS BORDERS 15-16
(Am.-Arab Discrimination Comm. 2007) [hereinafter AM.-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
COMM. & CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS, NSEERS], available at
http://www.adc.orgiPDF/nseerspaper.pdf.
87. See generally AM.-ARAB ANTI- DISCRIMINATION COMM. & CTR. FOR
IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS, NSEERS, supra note 86.
88. Fact Sheet, ICE, Changes to National Security Entry/Exit Registration System
(NSEERS) Dec. 1, 2003, available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/
nseersFS120103.htm; see AM.-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM. & CTR. FOR
IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS, NSEERS, supra note 86, at 6.
89. Suspending the 30-Day and Annual Interview Requirements from the Special
Registration Process for Certain Nonimmigrants, 68 Fed. Reg. 67577, 67578 (Dec. 2,
2003) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 264); ICE Fact Sheet, supra note 88; see also AM.-
ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM. & CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS, NSEERS, supra
note 86, at 10.
90. Suspending the 30-Day and Annual Interview Requirements from the Special
Registration Process for Certain Nonimmigrants, 68 Fed. Reg. 67577, 67578 (Dec. 2,
2003) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 264); ICE Fact Sheet, supra note 88; see also AM.-
ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM. & CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS, NSEERS, supra
note 86, at 18.
91. Suspending the 30-Day and Annual Interview Requirements from the Special
Registration Process for Certain Nonimmigrants, 68 Fed. Reg. 67577, 67578 (Dec. 2,
2003) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 264); see also AM.-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
COMM. & CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS, NSEERS, supra note 86, at 18.
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"over," but also failed to address many of the residual problems
associated with the implementation of the program. 9 2
I. Other Discriminatory Acts
The government's targeting of individuals from Muslim-majority
countries after 9/11 coincided with the increase in hate crimes and
related violent acts by private actors against this population.93 These acts
were documented by the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
and the Council on American-Islamic Relations with chilling detail.94
One profile of a hate crime murder in Mesa, AZ published in the ADC
Report read:
49-year-old Indian Sikh, Balbir Singh Sodhi, was shot while planting
flowers outside his Chevron station. His murderer, 42-year-old Frank
Roque, had spent the day drinking and raving about how he wanted
to kill the "rag heads" responsible for the terrorist attacks four days
earlier. After being kicked out of a bar, Roque went on a shooting
rampage. He first shot and killed Sodhi, and afterwards fired on the
home of an Afghan family. He then shot several times at a Lebanese-
American clerk who escaped injury. During his arrest he yelled, "I
am a patriot!" and "I stand for America all the way!"95
One scholar has associated the combination of government policies and
private acts targeted at Arab, Muslims and South Asians as a "de-
Americanization" process, which can be defined as "a twisted brand of
xenophobia that is not simply hatred of foreigners but also hatred of
those who in fact may not be foreigners but whom the vigilantes would
prefer being removed from the country anyway."9 6
92. AM.-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM. & CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS,
NSEERS, supra note 86, at 18-21.
93. See e.g., Gil Gott, The Devil We Know: Racial Subordination and National
Security Law, 50 VILL. L. REv. 1073, 1110-20 (2005); Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared
by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259
(2004).
94. See Gott, supra note 93, at 1110 (citing Council on American-Islamic Relations,
The Status of Muslim Civil Rights in the United States 2004 4-5 (2004)); see also AM.-
ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., 1991 REPORT ON ANTI-ARAB HATE CRIMES: ADC
SPECIAL REPORT 5 (Am.-Arab Discrimination Comm. 1992).
95. AM.-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., REPORT ON HATE CRIMES AND
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ARAB-AMERICANS: THE PoST-SEPTEMBER 11 BACKLASH 69
(Am.-Arab Discrimination Comm. 2003) (hereinafter AM.-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
COMM., REPORT ON HATE CRIMES), available at http://www.adc.org/PDF/hcr02.pdf.
96. Bill Ong Hing, Vigilante Racism: The De-Americanization of Immigrant
America, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 441, 444 (2002). In one of his many chilling accounts of
"De-Americanization" Hing recounts the celebration of the reopening of a General
Motors plant at which former Congressman Norman Mineta was asked "and how long
have you lived in our country?" Even though Mineta was born in San Jose, CA and
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Airport discrimination against the Arab, Muslim and South Asian
population also increased following 9/11.97 Not long after the attacks of
Sept. 11, 2001, the New York Times coined the term "flying while
brown" to refer to the "reports of Muslim-Americans being asked to get
off planes."" Moreover, between 2001 and 2009, the Department of
Transportation and the Transportation Security Administration together
received more than 2000 complaints about civil rights violations. 99
Discrimination at airports was also documented by the American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee, which found that "discrimination at
airports based on stereotyping, over-zealousness [sic] or prejudice by
airline personnel or even other passengers is now one of the main sources
of discrimination facing Arab-American travelers., 0o
Finally, employment discrimination against Muslims and South
Asians heightened following 9/11. In the fifteen months following the
September 11, 2001 attacks, the Equal Employment Opportunity
attended school in California, this question highlights how Mineta was "de-
Americanized" (as does his family's internment during World War II). Id. at 455.
97. See, e.g., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AVIATION
CONSUMER REPORTS (2009), available at http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/
index.htm; see also Phil Hirschkorn & Michael Okwu, Airlines Face Post 9/11 Racial
Profiling, Discrimination Suits, CNN, June 4, 2002, http://archives.cnn.com/2002/
LAW/06/04/airlines.discrimination/; AM.-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., REPORT
ON HATE CRIMES, supra note 95, at 21-31.
98. Somini Sengupta, Sept. 11 Attack Narrows the Racial Divide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
10, 2001, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/10/nyregion/a-nation-
challenged-relations-sept-11-attack-narrows-the-racial-divide.html?pagewanted=1.
99. See Spencer S. Hsu & Sholnn Freeman, JetBlue, TSA Workers Settle in T-Shirt
Case, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2009, at A2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/01/05/AR2009010502877.html; see also OFFICE OF AVIATION
ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, supra note 97.
100. AM.-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., REPORT ON HATE CRIMES, supra note
95, at 7. Notwithstanding the complaints documented by the United States government
and civil rights organizations, Michael Kirkpatrick and Margaret Kwoka conclude that no
single victim of airport discrimination has prevailed under a "disparate impact" theory
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Michael T. Kirkpatrick & Margaret B. Kwoka,
Title VI Disparate Impact Claims Would Not Harm National Security: A Response to
Paul Taylor, 46 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 503, 516 (2009). In fact, not one of the five lawsuits
filed by the American Civil Liberties Union against American, Continental, Northwest,
and United airlines even made it to trial. See id. In one of these cases, Dasrath v.
Continental Airlines, three men were removed from a plane after a passenger reported
that three "brown skin[ned] men" were "behaving suspiciously." Dasrath v. Continental
Airlines, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436 (D.N.J. 2006). The court ultimately granted a
summary judgment stating that "when the circumstances are viewed in their entirety, a
jury would be compelled to find that security considerations were the sole reason for
Dasrath's removal, even though Dasrath had not engaged in suspicious behavior."
Kirkpatrick & Kwoka, supra at 516 (citing Dasrath, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 446) (internal
citations omitted). Kirkpatrick and Kwoka associate Dasrath's loss to the high legal bar
required for succeeding in discrimination lawsuits based on disparate impact. Kirkpatrick
& Kwoka, supra at 516.
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Commission handled nearly 700 complaints related specifically to the
attacks.o
The foregoing summary is by no means exhaustive and in fact only
identifies a handful of the dozens of largely Executive branch national
security policies issued after 9/11 that implicated noncitizens. It is
appropriate to acknowledge that some of the aforementioned policies are
not inherently objectionable, but are offensive when selectively applied
to particular nationalities, religions and ethnicities, without a measurable
national security benefit. In response to these policies, scores of
scholars, policymakers, and lawyers have criticized the unequal status
held by Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians following 9/11.102
Interestingly, these critics are not limited to immigration experts, but also
include representatives from the human rights, civil rights, privacy rights,
religious, and ethnic arenas.10 3 This article does not seek to rehash the
criticism here but instead makes three observations for current
discussion. First, nearly nine years later, many of the changes made after
9/11 remain "on the books," and in some cases continue to
disproportionately impact noncitizens from Muslim-majority countries
101. See Gott, supra note 93, at 1118. See also AM.-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
COMM., Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Fact Sheet,
http://www.adc.org/index.phpid=1682 (2002); Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Provides
Answers About Workplace Rights of Muslims, Arabs, South Asians and Sikhs (May 15,
2002), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/5-15-02.cfm.
102. See e.g., Dawinder S. Sidhu, Wartime America and The Wire: A Response to
Posner's Post-9/11 Constitutional Framework, 20 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 37, 64
(2009); Volpp, supra note 68, at 1576 ("September 11 facilitated the consolidation of a
new identity category that groups together persons who appear Middle Eastern, Arab, or
Muslim. This consolidation reflects a racialization wherein members of this group are
identified as terrorists and are disidentified as citizens."); Kevin R. Johnson, Lecture, The
Fiftieth Annual Dyson Distinguished Lecture: The Forgotten "Repatriation" of Persons
ofMexican Ancestry and Lessons for the "War on Terror," 26 PACE L. REv. 1, 14 (2005);
Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After
September 11, 2001: The Targeting ofArabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L.
295, 351-53 (2002); Raquel Aldana, The September 11 Immigration Detentions and
Unconstitutional Executive Legislation, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 5 (2005); ACLU, SANCTIONED
BIAS: RACIAL PROFILING SINCE 9/11 (2004), available at www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/
racial%20profiling%20report.pdf.
103. America's Challenge: Domestic Security, Civil Liberties, and National Unity
After September 11, June 30, 2003-Migration Policy Institute; Targets of Suspicion:
The Impact of Post-9/11 Policies on Muslims, Arabs and South Asians in the United
States May 31, 2004, Immigration Policy Center; Above the Law: Executive Power after
September 11 in the United States, January 31, 2004 - Human Rights Watch; Assessing
the New Normal: Liberty and Security for the Post-September II United States
September 30, 2003-Human Rights First; How Changes to U.S. Law & Policy Since
9/11 Erode Human Rights and Civil Liberties March 11, 2003-The Lawyers Committee
for Human Rights; Presumption of Guilt: Human Rights Abuses of Post-September 11
Detainees, August 31, 2002-Human Rights Watch; Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling
After September 11: The Department of Justice's 2003 Guidelines, 50 Loy. L. REv. 67,
79, at n.61 (2004) (hereinafter Johnson, Racial Profiling After September 11).
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and their families. Second, the government's role in ameliorating the
discriminatory impact of these policies through a series of office posts,
public statements, and community outreach has been limited, and in
some cases, ineffective. Third, the government has not been held
accountable for failing to quantify the national security benefits of many
of the foregoing 9/11 immigration policies. The aforementioned
observations are discussed in the following three sections.
III. CONTINUING IMPACT OF POST 9-11 IMMIGRATION PRACTICES
A. Special Registration Residue
The harsh effects of immigration policies enacted in the name of
9/11 continue to disproportionately impact noncitizens from Muslim-
majority countries. To illustrate, the aforementioned NSEERS program
continues to affect scores of individuals visiting and residing in the
United States, as well as their family members. Those affected include,
but are not limited to, individuals who: 1) did not comply with the
NSEERS program and at some point after the registration period sought
an immigration benefit or relief from removal; or 2) complied with
NSEERS but during the course of registration were found to be out of
status. Individuals falling in the former category include those who were
unaware of the NSEERS program, and those who were aware of the
program, but were afraid to register. A meaningful number of these
"NSEERS violators" have been deemed to have "willfully failed" to
register even in situations where little to no evidence has been put forth
regarding "willfulness." In one case, one private attorney reported her
client had applied for adjustment (green card) status before an
immigration judge, based on his marriage to a United States citizen.104
The immigration judge required the client to first undergo "late
registration" under NSEERS with a local ICE office by December
2009.105 The attorney appeared with her client at a local ICE office for
late registration, and following unforeseen delays, highlighted the
interview details:
I explained again that this young man had no reason not to register [at
the time NSEERS was implemented], he was in valid status, had just
turned 17, didn't speak English, was trying to deal with a new high
school in the US and had he known about Registration, he would
have registered. The agents said it was no excuse. They said absent
catastrophic illness or jail, there was not a valid excuse. I explained
104. Posting of Fahed Al-Rawaf to Race Matters, http://endnseers.
blogspot.com/2009/1 1/commentary-on-late-nseers-registration.html (Nov. 16, 2009).
105. See id.
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that is not a correct standard. They had to determine if it was
"willful." They said that no one would be a "willful" violator if all
they had to say was they didn't know.106
What is remarkable about the foregoing tale is that a person who was
represented by a premier immigration attorney and had a brother who
was able to clear late registration under the same circumstances,
nevertheless received a "willful violator" stamp in his passport.' 07
In addition to creating a burdensome and disparate process for
applicants subject to late registration, immigration adjudicators have also
denied immigration benefits or relief, in part or solely due to an
individual's noncompliance with the NSEERS program. 108 The harsh
repercussions of such denials on American families and employers are
evident by the fact that eligibility for an immigration benefit or relief
from removal are often based on the noncitizen's relationship with a
United States citizen spouse or employer. A recent report by the Center
for Immigrants' Rights at Pennsylvania State University's Dickinson
School of Law and the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
(ADC-Penn State Report) highlights the story of a native and citizen of
Morocco who was denied a green card despite good-faith attempts to
comply with special registration, his loving marriage to a United States
citizen, and their three U.S.-born children.109 As summarized by the
ADC-Penn State report ". . . Nasser was denied adjustment of status and
was found to have 'willfully' violated NSEERS. This has left Mr.
Nasser in the difficult position of being ineligible to work because he has
no legal status in the United States, and has harshly impacted him and
members of his immediate family.""o In addition to those residing in the
United States, the NSEERS program has also impacted visiting students
and scholars."' The government's selective use of NSEERS information
to deny immigration benefits and relief also confirms the government's
conversion of a program once premised on national security into one
utilized as an everyday immigration enforcement tool.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. See AM.-ARAB ANT-DIScRIMINATION COMM. & CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS,
NSEERS, supra note 86, at 10.
109. Id. at 10.
110. Id.atil.
111. Id.
1508 [Vol. 114:4
HeinOnline  -- 114 Penn St. L. Rev. 1508 2009-2010
BUSINESS AS USUAL
B. Recasting National Security Policy as Immigration Law
Enforcement Tools.
Like with the NSEERS program, the government has re-
characterized many of the 9/11 policies as general immigration
enforcement tools, forgetting the context under which such policies arose
and the individuals that continue to suffer as a consequence. For
example, the above-described 48-hour rule remains good law, as does the
absence of a timeframe for serving an NTA on the noncitizen and with
the immigration court.1 12  Similarly, the Department of Homeland
Security has expanded the once Muslim-focused Alien Absconder
Initiative into a "National Fugitive Operations Program" targeting all
noncitizens with outstanding orders of removal.1 3 One could argue that
the government has improved its policies by applying the 48-hour rule
and "fugitive" program universally to all noncitizens, as opposed to
concentrating on select nationalities, ethnicities, or religions. However,
this fact still provides little information about how select groups have
been impacted as initial targets, and on a broader level, fails to clarify
whether such policies improved national security or mitigated the harms
suffered by Arab, Muslim, and South Asian communities. These harms
include "being treated less favorably than others for inadequate
reasons,... personal feelings of humiliation, unfair treatment, a loss of
dignity, a loss of confidence, and the sense of being seen and treated as
an outsider."'
1 14
The harms of the 9/11 policies to individuals and families extend
beyond those who remain in or continue to visit the United States.
Although less quantifiable, a meaningful number of individuals from
Muslim-majority countries have left the United States solely or in part
due to the heightened restrictions imposed on such individuals after 9/11.
While the twenty-four Muslim-majority nations make up only 2% of the
undocumented population, there was a 31.4% increase in deportation
within this group in the years following 9/11." In addition to formal
removals following 9/11, Muslims voluntarily fled U.S. neighborhoods
in large numbers."16
112. See Aliens and Nationality, 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2009).
113. ICE, National Fugitive Operations Program, http://www.ice.gov/pi/dro/nfop.htm
(2008).
114. Legomsky, Ethnic and Religious Profiling, supra note 61, at 183.
115. Rashad Hussain, Preventing the New Internment: A Security-Sensitive Standard
for Equal Protection Claims in the Post-9/11 Era, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 117, 137-38
(2007).
116. See, e.g., Sarah Stuteville, Trouble in Little Pakistan, VOICES THAT MUST BE
HEARD (May 26, 2004), available at http://www.indypressny.org/nycma/voices/119/
briefs/briefs_1/.
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Notably, the U.S. government continues to identify counterterrorism
as a premise for targeting new profiling policies at Muslim-majority
countries. One policy arose following a bombing attempt from a
Nigerian man who boarded a U.S.-bound plane on December 25, 2009,
in Amsterdam, Netherlands.'" 7  The suspect, Umar Farouk Abdul
Mutallab, hid the explosives in his underwear but was caught in time by
members of the airline crew and passengers."8 Days after the incident,
the Transportation Security Agency announced that it would require
nationals from the following 14 nations to undergo heightened screening
when entering the United States: Cuba, Sudan, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan,
Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia,
and Yemen." 9 Critics of the new screening programs believe the
screening procedures are nothing less than racial and religious
profiling.120 Within this group are those who argue that extra patdowns
based on a person's religion or nationality are an ineffective
counterterrorism tool at best and a discriminatory program no different
from NSEERS at worst.12 1 Most recently, and in a seeming effort to
move away from nationality as a basis for extra screening, President
117. Posting of Macon Phillips to White House Blog, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
blog/2009/12/28/president-addresses-public-attempted-terrorist-attack (Dec. 28, 2009,
04:35 PM EST); Dan Eggen, Karen DeYoung, & Spencer S. Hsu, Plane Suspect was
Listed in Terror Database After Father Alerted U.S. Officials, WASH. POST, Dec. 27,
2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/25/
AR2009122501355.html.
118. Phillips, supra note 117; Dan Eggen, Karen DeYoung, & Spencer S. Hsu, Plane
Suspect was Listed in Terror Database After Father Alerted U.S. Officials, WASH. POST,
Dec. 27, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2009/12/25/AR2009122501355.html.
119. TSA.gov, TSA Statement on New Security Measures for International Flights to
the U.S., http://www.tsa.gov/press/happenings/010310_statement.shtm (Jan. 3, 2010);
Muslim-American Group Criticizes TSA Plan as Profiling, CNN, Jan. 4, 2010, available
at http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/01/04/tsa.measures.muslims/index.html; Eric
Lipton, U.S. Intensifies Air Screening for Fliers from 14 Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4,
2010, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/04/us/04webtsa.html?hp=&
pagewanted=all.
120. ADC Statement Regarding New TSA Directives, http://endnseers.blogspot.com/
2010/01/adc-statement-regarding-new-tsa.htmil.
121. See, e.g., Posting of Under the Radar to Politico, http://www.politico.com/blogs/
joshgerstein/01 10/TSAsechoes ofAshcroft.html (Jan. 5, 2010, 12:58 EST); Posting of
Targeting Needles or Adding More Hay?: Airport Profiling 'Countries of Interest', and
American Security to Race Matters, http://endnseers.blogspot.com/201 0/01/targeting-
needles-or-adding-more-hay.htmi (Jan. 27, 2010); Posting of James J. Zogby, to Race
Matters, http://endnseers.blogspot.com/2010/01/profiling-is-back.html (Jan. 11, 2010);
Posting of New TSA Guidelines Troubling and Ultimately Ineffective, to Race Matters,
http://endnseers.blogspot.com/2010/01/adc-statement-regarding-new-tsa.html (Jan. 8,
2010); AM.-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., ADC AND BROAD COALITION OBJECT TO
TSA RECENT DIRECTIVES THAT NEGATIVELY IMPACT 700 MILLION PEOPLE,
http://www.adc.org/index.php?id=3532 (Jan. 8, 2010).
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Obama signed off on a new security initiative that utilizes "intelligence
information and assessment of threats to identify passengers who could
have links to terrorism."1 22
IV. GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO DISCRIMINATORY IMPACT OF POST
9-11 POLICIES
A. Executive Branch
Following the 9/11 attacks, former President George W. Bush made
a series of public statements that effectively acknowledged the "good"
Muslims in the United States and throughout the world.123 Two days
after 9/11, he stated, "Our nation must be mindful that there are
thousands of Arab Americans ... who love their flag just as much as ...
[we] do. And we must be mindful that as we seek to win the war that we
treat Arab Americans and Muslims with the respect they deserve."1 24
While messages such as this one seem contradictory when balanced
against the anti-Muslim and anti-Arab sentiment permeating many of the
9/11 policies, scholar Karen Engle argues that both messages are
necessary to help legitimize the war on terror.125
Congress and the Executive Branch also attempted to ameliorate the
backlash against Arab Muslims, and South Asians in a number of ways.
As part of the historic signing of the USA Patriot Act of 2001, Congress
included "findings" and "sense of Congress" language to acknowledge
the violent actions taken against Arab Americans and Muslim Americans
following 9/11; the heroic actions of this community during the attacks;
and the importance of preserving the safety and civil rights and civil
liberties of all communities, including Arab Americans, Muslim
Americans, and Americans from South Asia. 126 The Patriot Act also
included a directive to the Department of Justice's Inspector General to
review, analyze and publicly report on allegations of civil rights and civil
liberties violations committed by Department employees and officials.127
Following 9/11, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights
with the Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division (CRD) created the
Initiative to Combat Post-9/11 Discriminatory Backlash (CRD Project),
in an effort to address "violations of civil rights laws against Arab,
122. Jeff Zeleny, Security Checks on Flights to U.S. to Be Revamped, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 2, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/02/us/02terror.html.
123. Karen Engle, Constructing Good Aliens and Good Citizens: Legitimizing the
War on Terror(ism), 75 U. COLo. L. REv. 59, 106 (2004).
124. Id. at 107.
125. Id. at 109.
126. USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 102, 15 Stat. 272 (2001).
127. USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 1001, 15 Stat. 272 (2001).
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Muslim, Sikh, and South-Asian Americans, and those perceived to be
members of these groups." 28  The CRD Project was initiated by three
former CRD attorneys who began receiving complaints from the Arab,
Muslim and South Asian community immediately after September 11,
2001.129 Within a few days of approaching the former Assistant Attorney
General of Civil Rights, the CRD Project was formally established to act
as a clearinghouse and investigatory body for discrimination complaints
post 9-11 including but not limited to housing/public accommodations,
employment, and hate crimes. 130 The CRD Project eventually received a
formal staff and in addition to processing complaints, played a role in
facilitating inter-government agency dialogues as well as conversations
between these agencies and affected community groups.1 31
In 2003, the Department of Justice issued guidance on racial
profiling (2003 DOJ Guidance).132 The stated purpose of the guidance
was to "prohibit racial profiling in law enforcement practices without
hindering the important work of our Nation's public safety officials,
particularly the intensified anti-terrorism efforts precipitated by the
events of September 11, 2001."'" Notably, the 2003 DOJ Guidance
makes an exception for investigations relating to national security,
noting:
Federal law enforcement officers who are protecting national security
or preventing catastrophic events (as well as airport security
screeners) may consider race, ethnicity, and other relevant factors to
the extent permitted by our laws and the Constitution. Similarly,
because enforcement of the laws protecting the Nation's borders may
necessarily involve a consideration of a person's alienage in certain
circumstances, the use of race or ethnicity in such circumstances is
properly Ioverned by existing statutory and constitutional
standards.
128. DOJ, Civil Rights Division, Initiative to Combat Post-9/11 Discriminatory
Backlash, http://www.justice.gov/crt/legalinfo/nordwg-mission.php (2008).
129. Interview with Deepa lyer, Executive Director, South Asian Americans Leading
Together, (Feb. 18, 2010, 10:30am).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. DOJ, Civil Rights Division, Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal
Law Enforcement Agencies, http://www.justice.gov/crt/split/documents/guidance-
on-race.php (June 2003).
133. DOJ, Civil Rights Division, Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal
Law Enforcement Agencies, http://www.justice.gov/crt/split/documents/guidance
on-race. php (June 2003).
134. DOJ, Civil Rights Division, Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal
Law Enforcement Agencies, http://www.justice.gov/crt/split/documents/guidance
on-race.php (June 2003). The policy cites to United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, a case in
which the Supreme Court found that "[tihe likelihood that any given person of Mexican
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Moreover, the 2003 DOJ Guidance also clarifies that it serves only as a
vehicle for internal management and should not be construed to create a
procedural or substantive right or benefit enforceable by law.135  The
national security exception has been criticized by many scholars and
advocates as one that merely swallows the "rule" and permits the kind of
profiling that took place after 9/11.136 One scholar has concluded,
[t]he result of this policy guidance is to ban racial profiling in
counterterrorism efforts of everyone except Arabs, Muslims, and
South Asians, as the profiling of these communities is almost always
the purported basis of national security, and because it is almost
always exclusively those communities that are suspected of
137terrorism.
Beginning in March 2003, many of the immigration-related
functions once held by the Department of Justice's Immigration and
Naturalization Service were transferred to the Department of Homeland
Security.138 Notably, the Department of Homeland Security adopted the
racial profiling guidance created by the Department of Justice. A related
statement on race-neutrality by the Department of Homeland Security
states, "The Department of Homeland Security's policy is to prohibit the
consideration of race or ethnicity in our daily law enforcement activities
in all but the most exceptional instances." 3 9  The DHS statement
ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor" in an
immigration stop. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975).
135. DOJ, Civil Rights Division, Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal
Law Enforcement Agencies, http://www.justice.gov/crt/split/documents/guidance
onrace.php (June 2003).
136. ACLU & THE RIGHTS WORKING GROUP, THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL AND
ETHNIC PROFILING IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (2009) available at http://www.aclu.org/
files/pdfs/humanrights/cerdjfinalreport.pdf; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, THREAT
AND HUMILIATION: RACIAL PROFILING, NATIONAL SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES (2007) available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/racial-profiling/report/;
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION FUND, WRONG THEN, WRONG
Now: RACIAL PROFILING BEFORE & AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 available at
http://www.civilrights.org/publications/wrong-then/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2010); The
Rights Working Group, Issue Brief, Full of Holes: The 2003 Department of Justice
Guidance Regarding the Use ofRace by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, available at
http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/sites/default/files/DOJGuidanceIssueBrieflpdf (last
visited Feb. 10, 2010); Johnson, Racial Profiling After September 11, supra note 103, at
83; Joseph D. Pollak, Racial Profiling is Wrong: A Doctrinal Comparison of Counter-
Terrorism Racial Profiling in Europe and the United States, (April 13, 2009)
(unpublished working paper), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1390269.
137. Ahmad, supra note 93, at 1268; see also Johnson, Racial Profiling After
September 11, supra note 103, at 84 ("The guidelines themselves inadvertently reveal the
potential for excessive reliance on race.").
138. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1103 (2010).
139. Memorandum from Tom Ridge, Sec'y. of the Dep't of Homeland Security, about
The Department of Homeland Security's Commitment to Race Neutrality in Law
15132010]
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continues "DHS personnel may use race or ethnicity only when a
compelling governmental interest is present. Rather than relying on race
or ethnicity, it is permissible and indeed advisable to consider an
individual's connections to countries that are associated with significant
terrorist activity."l40 This language is troubling in part because it infers
that profiling based on nationality or national origin is permissible and in
fact preferable.14 1 While profiling based on nationality or national origin
may not be inherently wrong, there are at least five reasons why it is
offensive and in many cases no different from profiling based on race,
ethnicity or religion: 1) in practice many policies based on nationality
disproportionately impact particular religions and ethnicities; 2) this
disproportionate impact creates the perception that a particular policy is
premised on anti-Arab or anti-Muslim sentiment; 3) most of the countries
identified by the government as harboring terrorists have been Arab or
Muslim; 4) in practice "nationality" based profiling is often conflated
with "national origin" profiling; 5) profiling based on country of birth
has extended to naturalized United States from particular countries,
leading to the presumption that citizens from particular places are
somehow less reliable or loyal in their allegiances to the United States.14 2
The Department of Homeland Security also created a Traveler
Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) for individuals who face traveling
delays or mishaps during screening.14 3 According to then Homeland
Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, "[t]his is a win-win program.
Eliminating false-positives makes the travel experience more pleasant for
legitimate visitors, and it frees up our front-line personnel to apply even
greater scrutiny of those individuals who truly present safety and security
risks."'4
Pursuant to its statutory authority and mission, the Department of
Homeland Security's Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties has
dialogued with various advocacy groups about 9/11 programs, and
further investigated complaints alleging discrimination against a person
returning to the United States from Saudi Arabia after completing the
Enforcement Activities (June 1, 2004), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CRCL
MemoCommitmentRaceNeutralityJune04.pdf.
140. Id.
141. See also ASIAN L. CAUCUS & STAN. L. IMMIGRANTS' RTs. CLINIC, RETURNING
HOME: HOW THE U.S. GOVERNMENT PRACTICES UNDERMINE CIVIL RIGHTS AT OUR
NATION'S DOORSTEP 30-31 (2009).
142. See Legomsky, Ethnic and Religious Profiling, supra note 61, at 191-193; ASIAN
L. CAUCUS & STAN. L. IMMIGRANTS' RTS. CLINIC, supra note 141, at 24-32.
143. DHS, DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP), http://www.dhs.gov/
files/programs/gcj 169676919316.shtm (2009).
144. TSA, Press Release, DHS Launches Traveler Redress Inquiry Program-DHS
Trip Provides a Central Gateway for Travel-Related Issues (Feb. 21, 2007), available at
http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2007/press-release_02212007.shtm.
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Hajj religious pilgrimage; DHS TRIP travelers' complaints alleging
discrimination based on race, disability, religion, gender, or ethnicity;
and related allegations of discrimination and profiling by DHS
employees. 14 5 Likewise, the DHS OIG has investigated civil rights and
civil liberties-related complaints and issued reports on the quality and
efficiency of various programs implemented after 9/11 including but not
limited to TSA's screening procedures and DHS TRIP. 14 6 More recently,
the DHS OIG agreed to commence an inspection on the NSEERS
program in 2010 and to date, has met with stakeholders about the
operational aspects and human consequences of the program.14 7
In addition to creating public mission statements and mechanisms
for handling complaints, the Department of Homeland Security has also
issued limited policy guidance to remedy the various 9/11 measures
outlined above. In response to the findings and recommendations in the
OIG Detainee Report documenting the procedural defects and
mistreatment suffered by special interest detainees, the Department of
Homeland Security's former Under Secretary for Border and
Transportation Security issued policy guidance (2004 Guidance)
instructing officers to make charging determinations and serve detainees
with an NTA in a timely manner absent emergency or extraordinary
circumstances.14 8 Consistent with the regulations, the 2004 Guidance
instructs officers to make a charging determination within 48 hours of
arrest or detention, and also creates a 72 hour policy for serving
noncitizens with a NTA.149 Recognizing the regulatory exception to the
48-hour rule, the 2004 Guidance also identifies examples of potential
emergency or other extraordinary circumstances. 5so Unfortunately, these
145. See, e.g., DHS, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, FIRST QUARTER
FISCAL YEAR 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrarylassets/crcl first QuarterReport to_CongressFY_2009.pdf.
146. See, e.g., DHS, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, ONE DHS UNITED:
SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 31-44 (2009), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/semiannlrpts/OIGSARAprO9_Sep09.pdf.
147. AM.-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., Press Release, Office of Inspector
Gen. at DHS to Audit NSEERS at the Request of ADC and Other Major Organizations,
Nov. 19, 2009 (available at http://adc.org/index.php?id=3524).
148. Memorandum from Asa Hutchinson, Undersec'y Border and Transp. Sec., to
Michael J. Garcia, Assistant Sec'y U.S. ICE & Robert Bonner, Comm'r U.S. CBP, about
Guidance on ICE Implementation of Policy and Practice Changes Recommended by the
Department of Justice Inspector General, Mar. 30, 2004, available at
http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/ICEGuidance.pdf.
149. Id.
150. Id. For a more detailed analysis of the Hutchinson Guidance, see Wadhia, The
Policy and Politics of Immigrant Rights, supra note 55; Wadhia, Under Arrest, supra
note 55; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Immigration: Mind Over Matter, 5 U. MD. L.J. RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 201 (2005).
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examples have been criticized as broad enough to swallow the well-
intentioned timeframes identified by the DHS.'5 '
B. Legislative Branch
The legislation creating DHS also established a statutory office of
civil rights and civil liberties (DHS CRCL)15 2 as well as Office of
Inspector General (DHS OIG).'" The mission of the DHS CRCL is to
provide legal and policy advice to DHS components about civil rights
and civil liberties matters; investigate related complaints; direct DHS'
equal employment opportunity (EEO) programs; and engage in
community outreach.15 4 The mission of the DHS OIG is "to serve as an
independent and objective inspection, audit, and investigative body to
promote effectiveness, efficiency, and economy in the Department of
Homeland Security's programs and operations, and to prevent and detect
fraud, abuse, mismanagement, and waste in such programs and
operations."155
Congress passed legislation in 2004 to strengthen the oversight and
investigatory capacity of the DHS CRCL and OIG. Specifically, the
Homeland Security Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Protection Act of
2004 (CRCLPA) requires the DHS' Officer for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties to: 1) report directly to the Secretary of DHS; and 2) review
and assess information concerning civil rights abuses and profiling on the
basis of race, ethnicity, or religion by DHS employees and officials. 5 6
CRCLPA further amplified the civil rights officer's responsibilities to
include the investigation of complaints alleging civil rights-related
abuses and mistreatment and created a statutory senior position within
the OIG to review and investigate allegations of civil rights abuses by
DHS employees or contractors. 5 7
Likewise, legislation was introduced in 2004 by the Senate'5 8 and
House of Representatives 5 9 and again in the House in 2005160 to rollback
151. See Wadhia, The Policy and Politics of Immigrant Rights, supra note 55;
Wadhia, Under Arrest, supra note 55; Wadhia, Immigration, supra note 150.
152. DHS, Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/
structure/editorial_0371.shtm (2010).
153. DHS, Office of the Inspector General, http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/index.shtm
(2010).
154. DHS, Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, supra note 152.
155. DHS, Office of the Inspector General, supra note 153.
156. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, § 8303, 118 Stat. 3637, 3867 (2004).
157. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, §§ 8303-8304, 118 Stat. 3637, 3867-68 (2004).
158. See Civil Liberties Restoration Act of 2004, S. 2528, 108th Cong. (2004).
159. See Civil Liberties Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 4591, 108th Cong. (2004).
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a handful of the aforementioned immigration policies enacted by the
Executive Branch following 9/11. The Civil Liberties Restoration Act
(CLRA) was never enacted into law but contained a measured set of
remedies that would have terminated the Creppy Memo in favor of
presumptively opening immigration proceedings to the public in the
absence of a compelling government interest determination on a case-by-
case basis; 16 1 repealed the regulations associated with NSEERS and
provided limited relief to individuals with immediate eligibility for an
immigration benefit or relief from removal; and required noncitizens
held by DHS beyond 48 hours without charges or notice of charges to
see a judge to determine whether prolonged detention is appropriate;
among other provisions.162 While the CLRA was introduced more than
two years after 9/11, the political climate was not yet ripe for such
reforms.' 63 Nevertheless, the convictions expressed by co-sponsors of
CLRA were striking. 164
C. Judiciary Branch
In the courts, select federal court decisions have acknowledged
missteps by the government in the wake of 9/11. Notably, the number of
cases may be limited in light of the fact that the secrecy surrounding the
9/11 policies, and in particular the PENTBOTTM investigation may have
limited the number of challenges brought to the courts. As to the
constitutionality of closed immigration hearings, the Creppy Memo was
challenged in the federal courts as violating the First Amendment,
arguing in part that a wholesale closure of immigration hearings is not
"narrowly tailored" to meet a government interest.165 The Third and
Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals were split. 66
Beyond the three branches, and marking the transition to the Obama
Administration, a number of policymakers, and academics issued various
"blueprints" to the Administration with specific recommendations for
160. See Civil Liberties Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1502, 109th Cong. (2005).
161. See id.
162. See generally id.
163. See Wadhia, The Policy and Politics ofImmigrant Rights, supra note 55, at 420.
164. See, e.g., Cong. Rec. E588 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 2005) (statement of Rep. Berman).
165. See, e.g., Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 707 (6th Cir. 2002); N.
Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 225-26 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Editorial,
Deportation Behind Closed Doors, N.Y. TIMEs, May 30, 2003, at A26, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/30/opinion/deportation-behind-closed-doors.html.
166. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 692-93; see also N Jersey Media Group,
308 F.3d at 225-26; see also Lauren Gilbert, When Democracy Dies Behind Closed
Doors: The First Amendment and "Special Interest" Hearings, 55 RUTGERS L. REv. 741,
766 (2003).
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rolling back some of the resonating 9/11 immigration policies.167 For
example, on NSEERS, The Constitution Project recommended that the
government "[a]dopt legislation or regulations requiring that DHS may
not selectively target foreign nationals for deportation or other
immigration enforcement on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, or
political association or ideology.,1 6 8  On the 48-hour notice rule, an
informal coalition of policy experts recommended that the
Administration "[r]equire by regulation that a noncitizen detainee be
charged and issued a charging document within 48 hours of his or her
arrest or detention, and that, upon arrest, he or she be provided with oral
and written information concerning the right to representation by
qualified counsel, and how to schedule a timely custody hearing before
an immigration judge, independent of the date of the removal hearing.' 169
Leaders within the Obama Administration have also recognized the
residual effects of 9/11 on Arab, Muslim, and South Asian communities.
In his installation ceremony as the Assistant Attorney General in the
Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division, Tom Perez remarked
"Civil Rights in 2009 means ... understanding how the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks has subjected the Arab-American
and Muslim-American communities to an unjustified backlash, and
working to be sure we don't fall into the trap of believing that we either
protect our national security and safe streets OR we protect civil rights.
We can and must do both." 7 o Finally, in his inaugural address to the
nation, President Barack Obama remarked:
167. See, e.g., OBAMA-BIDEN TRANSITION PROJECT, IMMIGRATION POLICY:
TRANSITION BLUEPRINT (2008), available at http://law.psu.edu/_file/Irmigrants/
ImmigrationPolicyTransitionBlueprint.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, HOW TO REPAIR
THE U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION 13 (2008),
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/081204-ASY-asylum-blueprint.pdf;
MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, DHS AND IMMIGRATION: TAKING STOCK AND CORRECTING
COURSE 4 (2009), available at www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/DHSFeb09.pdf, ACLU,
ACTIONS FOR RESTORING AMERICA: TRANSITION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRESIDENT-
ELECT BARACK OBAMA 1 (2008), available at www.aclu.org/images/asset
upload-file734_37256.pdf. The Liberty & Security Transition Coalition "reflects the
ongoing, collaborative efforts of a coalition of more than twenty leading organizations
and over seventy-five people in the human rights and liberty and security communities."
LIBERTY & SECURITY TRANSITION COALITION, LIBERTY AND SECURITY:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS (2008), available at
http://2009transition.org/liberty-security/.
168. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, THE USE AND ABUSE OF IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY
AS COUNTERTERRORISM TOOL: CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 12 (2003),
available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/ImmigrationAuthorityAs A
CounterterrorismTool.pdf.
169. OBAMA-BIDEN TRANSITION PROJECT, supra note 167.
170. Thomas E. Perez, Asst. Att'y Gen. for Civ. Rts., Installation Ceremony Address
(Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/speeches/perez
installation-speech.php.
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To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual
interest and mutual respect. To those leaders around the globe who
seek to sow conflict, or blame their society's ills on the West, know
that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you
destroy. To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit
and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of
history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench
your fist.171
Arguably, the government's efforts to combat discrimination were
made more difficult by the public sentiments on racial profiling after
9/11. The events of 9/11 strained efforts to end racial profiling and
instead legitimized profiling based on race, religion, and national
origin.17 2 After 9/11, 58% of respondents to a Gallup poll supported
more intense screening for those who "appeared to be Arabs" while 50%
of the respondents favored special registration cards for ethnic Arabs
(including U.S. citizens).173
V. LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY
Despite the steps taken by the government and key stakeholders to
redress the discriminatory backlash and policies emanating from 9/11,
the impact has been minimal.
One test to measure accountability is to determine whether the 9/11
policies resulted in quantifiable improvements in national security.
Despite the criticisms raised against the PENTBOTTM detentions and
harsh immigration policies enacted after 9/11, the government has
offered very limited information about how these policies advanced
national security. Security experts and ex-officials of INS and the
Department of Homeland Security have questioned the national security
171. President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/.
172. Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the "Law of the
Land": United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for
Rebellious Lawyering, UC DAVIs LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES No. 174, at 65
(2009) [hereinafter Johnson, "The Law ofthe Land']. Karen Engle has argued that
today's profiling is both tolerated and even endorsed because it operates
alongside an open offer to those identified with profiled groups to demonstrate
that they are model members of their groups. Multiculturalism and tolerance
continue to be a desirable goal, if not a fact of life. In the spirit of tolerance,
good Muslims tolerate profiling.
Engle, supra note 123 at 94.
173. Johnson, "The Law of the Land," supra note 172, at 63. Notably, the
widespread support for profiling policies under the "war on terror" has continued despite
meaningful public debate opposition to foreign policy matters, including the Iraqi war.
Engle, supra note 123 at 105. Again, Engle attributes the public support for the war on
terrorism as a foundation for "good" versus "bad" aliens and citizens. Id. at 94-95.
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value of many of the aforementioned 9/11 laws. The former 9/11
Commission and related Terrorist Travel report (Commission Report)
analyzed the potential linkages between the 9/11 immigration policies
and benefits to national security. The Commission found scant security
value in the Alien Absconder Initiative, concluding, "[w]e have not
learned that any of the absconders were deported under a terrorism
statute, prosecuted for terrorism-related crimes, or linked in any way to
terrorism." 74 This sentiment was echoed by former INS Commissioner
Doris Meissner, when she remarked that the absconder initiative has
"marginal security benefits, while further equating national origin with
dangerousness.""
The Commission also documented the opposition expressed by
domestic and foreign government officials to the NSEERS program 76
and highlighted testimony from former General Counsel David Martin
stating that "call-in registration component of NSEERS may have
diminished the willingness of immigrant communities to supply the
government with intelligence."17 7 The New York Times also reported on
similar comments made by the former INS Commissioner James Ziglar
stating that "he and members of his staff had raised doubts about the
benefits of the special registration program when Justice Department
officials first proposed it. He said he had questioned devoting significant
resources to the initiative because he believed it unlikely that terrorists
would voluntarily submit to intensive scrutiny."l78 Mr. Ziglar continued,
"[t]o my knowledge, not one actual terrorist was identified. But what we
did get was a lot of bad publicity, litigation and disruption in our
relationships with immigrant communities and countries that we needed
help from in the war on terror."1 7 9 More recently, Robert Bonner, former
Commissioner of the Customs and Border Protection agency at the
Department of Homeland Security and Edward Alden, a senior fellow at
174. Thomas M. McDonnell, Targeting the Foreign Born by Race and Nationality:
Counterproductive in the "War on Terrorism, "? 16 PACE INT'L L. REV. 19, 34-35 (2004)
(quoting Michael Janofsky, 9/11 Panel Calls Policies on Immigration Ineffective, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2004, at A8, available at www.nytimes.com/2004/04/17/national!
17IMMI.html?pagewanted=1) (internal quotations omitted).
175. MUZAFFAR A. CHISHTI, ET AL., AMERICA'S CHALLENGE: DOMESTIC SECURITY,
CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND NATIONAL UNITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 13 (Migration Policy Inst.
2003), available at www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Americas Challenges.pdf.
176. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 9/11
AND TERRORIST TRAVEL STAFF REPORT 159 (2004), available at http://www.9-
11commission.gov/staff statements/911_TerrTravMonograph.pdf.
177. Id. at 160.
178. Rachel L. Swarns, Program's Value in Dispute As a Tool to Fight Terrorism,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/21/nationall
21 deport.html?pagewanted= I &-r- 1
179. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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the Council on Foreign Relations, noted "[a] program that pulls aside
only men from Muslim countries is not the sophisticated response
required to counter [terrorism] efforts ... . As the United States
continues the struggle against terrorism, it should constantly evaluate the
best tools at hand. Special registration is not one of these, and it should
be abolished."' 80
Similarly, the Government Accountability Office's assessment of
the voluntary interview program was speculative at best:
[t]he results of the project-in terms of how many, what types, and
the value of investigative leads obtained from the interviews-are
unknown because DOJ considers the information too sensitive to
divulge. Views about the impact of the project on community
relations were mixed, with some law enforcement officials indicating
that the project helped build ties between law enforcement and the
Arab community, while others indicated that the project had a
negative effect on such relations.181
In addition to the sentiments expressed by security experts, ex-
government officials and the government's own watchdogs, common
sense suggests that individuals seeking to engage in a terrorist act on
U.S. soil would not have voluntarily participated in programs such as
NSEERS and the voluntary interview program.
It should be acknowledged that the authors of the 9/11 attacks came
from specific regions of the world and that immigration law has long
included distinctions based on citizenry, national origin and ethnicity.' 82
Consequentially, reasonable scholars have disagreed about when and
what kind of profiling is appropriate.183 In his criticism of the racial and
ethnic profiling of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians following
September 11, 2001, scholar Thomas McDonnell notes:
[R]ace or ethnicity alone provide scant basis for suspecting an
individual of terrorist crimes. Most population surveys estimate that
there are 2.8 million to 6 million Arab Muslim immigrants living in
the United States. In purely mathematical terms, the odds that race or
180. Robert Bonner & Edward Alden, The Wrong Way to Screen Visitors, WASH.
POST, Nov. 21, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/11/20/AR2009112003375.html.
181. GAO REPORT, supra note 72 at 17.
182. See generally Legomsky, Ethnic and Religious Profiling, supra note 61.
183. "'Racial Profiling' occurs whenever a law enforcement officer questions, stops,
arrests, searches, or otherwise investigates a person because the officer believes that
members of that person's racial or ethnic group are more likely than the population at
large to commit the sort of crime the officer is investigating." Johnson, Racial Profiling
After September 11, supra note 103, at n.1 (quoting Samuel R. Gross & Debra
Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1413, 1415 (2002)); see
generally Johnson, "The Law of the Land", supra note 172.
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ethnicity alone will yield suspects is in the order of one in several
thousands, odds so remote as to make race or nationality relatively
little help in identifying terrorists.184
McDonnell further contends that reliance on racial profiles alone is
more likely to result in "false" positives, while also ignoring actual
wrongdoers who fail to fit such profiles.18' Distinguishing racial ethnic
profiling from nationality-based profiling, Philip Haymann and Juliette
Kayyemm have argued that profiling is effective but should instead focus
on nationality and its significance to one's loyalties as opposed to race
and ethnicity.' 86  Daphne Barak-Erez identifies several flaws in a
nationality-focused profile, including but not limited to the fact that there
is a strong relationship between nationality and racial and ethnic
affiliation; nationality-based profiling is not necessarily effective for
countries with large immigrant populations; and the potential negative
impact on American citizens and their families.'87 Meanwhile, Stephen
Legomsky makes a distinction between "rational" profiling and
"justified" profiling, arguing that law enforcement profiling should be
justifiable only when the practice is rational (profile corresponds to the
relevant danger) and sufficiently balanced to factor in both the efficiency
gains and substantial harms inherent in government-sponsored
discrimination based on ethnicity or religion. 88
In his work "Thinking Through Internment: 12/7 and 9/11," Jerry
Kang raises six meaningful points to the profiling discussion including
184. McDonnell, supra note 174, at 44-45.
185. Id. at 46. McDonnell illustrates this point by identifying shoe bomber Richard
Reid, dirty bomber Jose Padilla, and the French citizen Zacarias Moussaoui, none of
whom would have been subject to the special registration program. See id.
186. See Daphne Barak-Erez, Terrorism and Profiling: Shifting the Focus from
Criteria to Effects, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 1, 4 (2007).
187. Id. at 4-6. Barak-Erez argues for an altered form of profiling based on the kinds
of decisions to which it is applied. For example, he argues that profiling for purposes of
applying a more detailed visa process might be more acceptable than profiling for the
purposes of completely denying a visa. Id. at 7; see also Legomsky, Ethnic and Religious
Profiling, supra note 61, at 185. Legomsky argues:
the distinction [between country of nationality rather than nationality or
religion] should not be overstated. First, almost all the countries that the
United States has designated as harboring terrorists are predominantly Arab,
Muslim, or both. Even if, as it asserts, the administration's policy truly is not
driven by ethnicity or religion, the practical impact falls disproportionately on
one ethnic and one religious group. Second, so long as the impact is
disproportionate, large segments of the population will perceive, rightly or
wrongly, that the country-of-nationality distinction is merely a fagade for anti-
Arab or anti-Muslim sentiments-or at least that the same action would have
been politically infeasible had other ethnic groups been singled out.
Id.; see generally ASIAN L. CAUCUS & STAN. L. IMMIGRANTS' RTs. CLINIC, supra note
141.
188. Legomsky, Ethnic and Religious Profiling, supra note 61, at 178.
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but not limited to: 1) existence of data to show that particular policies
actually led to the identification of terrorists; 2) significance of the data
(Kang uses the following example "[s]o, even if the Arab-looking man
seated to your left is 100 times more likely to be a terrorist than the
Aryan-looking man seated to your right (relative), 100 times a number
essentially zero is still near zero (absolute))"; 3) benefit of utilizing
profiling to the number of lives saved in contrast to neutral tools that
may result in the same or even greater benefits; 4) harm to the victim and
his family; 5) context and consequence of the group being profiled; and
6) notwithstanding the empirical evidence, the existence of moral
principles that reject profiling measures.189
Kang's final point is complicated by the fact that in the case of
September 11, the government publicly opposed racial profiling while
somehow distinguishing it from the profiling of Arab and Muslim
looking men after 9/11. This distinction was made convenient by the
sentiment of the public and the low legal bar for profiling noncitizens
during times of national security. Far from discarding their moral
principles on profiling after 9/11, the remedial efforts made by the
Departments of Justice and Homeland Security and the legislature to
protect civil rights and civil liberties and condemn racial and ethnic
profiling suggest that someone in the government recognized the moral
implications of actions following 9/11. Nevertheless these efforts have
been largely unsuccessful in controlling the damage 9/11 policies have
caused to affected communities, or modifying the perception that
terrorists come from particular nations, ethnicities, and religions.
VI. THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
While the impact of the Iqbal decision on the notice-pleading
standard is striking, its effects on the permissiveness of selective
enforcement policies against foreign nationals are minimal, when
contextualized against the government's practices following 9/11. To the
extent that the Executive Branch and Congress have historically
overreacted to the threats posed by noncitizens during a national crisis by
eroding basic procedural safeguards, relaxing evidentiary standards, and
imposing excessive penalties against noncitizens based on race, religion,
ethnicity, nationality, national origin, and political ideology, the
"business as usual" standard is not unique to 9/11. In short, the Iqbal
decision merely reflects an accepted legal standard that permits the
government to selectively discriminate against foreign nationals.
189. Jerry Kang, Thinking Through Internment: 12/7 and 9/11, 9 AsIAN L.J. 195, 197-
200 (2002).
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A. Constitutional Rights ofNoncitizens: A BriefLesson
The plain language of the Constitution iterates one of Congress'
enumerated powers to include the "power to ... establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization.", 90 This has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court to give Congress the "plenary power" to regulate immigration
"beyond constitutional norms and judicial review."' 9' The plenary power
doctrine was portrayed in two early Supreme Court cases Chae Chan
Ping and Fong Yue Ting.192 For most of the nineteenth century, the
government relied on the plenary power doctrine to exclude and deport
noncitizens on the basis of race and national origin.'93 In Chae Chin
Ping (known also as the Chinese Exclusion Case), the Supreme Court
upheld a congressional measure that prohibited Chinese residents in the
United States departing to China for a visit to return to the United
States. 19 4 Justice Field held:
The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty
belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of those
sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its
exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the
interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or
restrained on behalf of any one.195
The Supreme Court made a similar holding in Fong Yue Ting, when
upholding a statutory provision that required "at least one credible white
witness" to attest to the residency of a Chinese individual in the United
190. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8 cl. 1, 4. Other scholars have identified the Commerce
Clause, the Migration or Importation Clause, and War Clause as additional sources for
federal immigration power. See, e.g., Aldana, supra note 102, at 17.
191. Frank H. Wu, The Limits of Borders: A Moderate Proposal for Immigration
Reform, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 35,43 (1996).
192. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); see also Gabriel J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping and Fong
Yue Ting: The Origins ofPlenary Power, in IMMIGRATION LAW STORIES (David Martin &
Peter Schuck eds., 2005). For an examination of the earliest cases establishing the
plenary power doctrine, see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY,
LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA, ch. 3 (Oxford University Press) (1987)
[hereinafter LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY].
193. The racist origins of the plenary power doctrine are well recognized by scholars.
See, e.g., Johnson, Lecture, supra note 102, at 531.
194. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 599-600. Importantly, when the Chinese
Exclusion case was decided the Supreme Court had not yet crafted the "heightened
scrutiny" or "strict scrutiny" standards. As such "the judicial deference to the legislative
branch, and its accompanying lack of interest in protecting the civil rights of racial
minorities, were normal and not anomalous for their time. They are abnormal and
anomalous today, though." Wu, supra note 191, at 47.
195. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609.
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States prior to the enactment of broader anti-Chinese legislation.196
Justice Horace Gray stated, "[t]he right of a nation to expel or deport
foreigners ... is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and
prevent their entrance into the country."' 97 Neither Chae Chan Ping nor
Fong Yue Ting have been overruled. The plenary power was further
protected by Congress's enactment of the national origins quota system
in 1924.198 Legal scholars have long criticized the plenary power
doctrine, arguing that constitutional protections ought to apply in the
immigration context.199 While the judiciary has recognized some level of
procedural due process in immigration matters,200 courts have remained
particularly loyal to "plenary power" and, in turn, deferential to the
Executive and Legislative branches. 20 ' Notably, this loyalty has
196. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 729; Wu, supra note 191, at 44.
197. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 707.
198. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration
Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. L. Q. 675, 689 (2000) (citing Immigration Act of 1924, ch.
190, § 11(a), 43 Stat. 153, 159 (repealed 1952)).
199. See Kif Augustine-Adams, The Plenary Power Doctrine After September 11, 38
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 701, 706 (2005); see also GERALD NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE
CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (Princeton University
Press) (1996); see generally Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference
that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L, REv. 1047 (1994); see generally Gabriel J. Chin,
Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of
Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1998); see generally Louis Henkin, The Constitution
and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100
HARV. L. REv. 853 (1987); see generally Linda Kelly, Preserving the Fundamental Right
to Family Unity: Championing Notions of Social Contract and Community Ties in the
Battle of Plenary Power Versus Aliens' Rights, 41 VILL. L. REv. 725 (1996); see
generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP, CT. REv. 255 (1985) [hereinafter Legomsky,
Immigration Law]; see generally Philip Monrad, Comment, Ideological Exclusion,
Plenary Power, and the PLO, 77 CAL. L. REv. 831 (1989); see generally Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional
Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990); see generally Cornelia T.
L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicial and
Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 SUP. CT. REv. 1 (1998);
see generally Victor C. Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal
Protection Review of Federal Alienage Classifications After Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pefia, 76 OR. L. REv. 425 (1997); see generally John A. Scanlan, Aliens in the
Marketplace ofIdeas: The Government, the Academy, and the McCarran- Walter Act, 66
TEX. L. REv. 1481 (1988); see generally Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished
Golden Door, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 965 (1993); see generally Margaret H. Taylor, Detained
Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous Border of the Plenary
Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087 (1995); see generally Wu, supra note
191.
200. For detailed support of the procedural due process "exception" to the plenary
power doctrine, see Legomsky, Immigration Law, supra note 199.
201. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, at 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.
concurring) ("[T]he underlying policies of what classes of aliens shall be allowed to enter
and what classes of aliens shall be allowed to stay, are for Congress exclusively to
determine even though such determination may be deemed to offend American traditions
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permitted a series of legislative acts targeting particular races,
nationalities, and alleged sympathizers of the Cold War and Communism
to survive judicial scrutiny.2 02
While the landmark case of Korematsu v. United States dealt with a
U.S. citizen, the case is instructive to the discussion about how the Court
analyzes racially based laws generated in times of war. Specifically, the
December 7, 1941 bombing of Pearl Harbor triggered strong anti-
Japanese sentiment from both the government and the public.203 I
February 1942, then President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive
Order 9066 allowing the U.S. military to enact any policies necessary for
the national security.204 While the Executive Order itself was facially
neutral it was utilized to validate restrictions on nearly every ethnic
Japanese in America.205 By December 1942, nearly 120,000 were
detained in camps along the West Coast.206 In Korematsu, the Supreme
Court upheld the validity of Executive Order 9066 ordering Japanese
Americans to internment camps during World War 11.207 Korematsu was
a United States citizen bom in California to Japanese parents convicted
of violating the aforementioned internment order.20 8 While the Court
found that the Executive Order violated the Equal Protection Clause and
and may, as has been the case, jeopardize peace."); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,
at 765-66 (1972) ("[T]he Court's general reaffirmations of [the plenary power doctrine]
have been legion ... [t]he Court without exception has sustained [it] . . . ."); Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, at 544 (1950) ("Whatever the procedure authorized by
Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned."); see also
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982); Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155
(1993); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1953) ("Due Process does not
invest any alien with a right to enter the United States, nor confer on those admitted the
right to remain against the national will. Nothing in the Constitution requires admission
or sufferance of aliens hostile to our scheme of government."); see also Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, at 696 (2001) ("terrorism" might warrant "special arguments" for
"heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters
of national security"); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) ("In the exercise of its
broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that
would be unacceptable if applied to citizens."); see also Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
202. See, e.g., The Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987 (2010); McCarran-
Walter Act of 1952, P.L. 82-414 (2010); Smith Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 2385 (2010).
203. See, e.g., Lugay, supra note 68, at 209; Kang, supra note 189, at 19; Volpp,
supra note 68, at 1575.
204. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942).
205. Lugay, supra note 68, at 213 (2005).
206. Id.
207. The race-based paradigm of the Japanese internment is further highlighted by the
fact that Italian Americans and German Americans, while also subject to internment
during this time, were assessed individually for their loyalty to the U.S. as opposed to
categorically presumed as disloyal and therefore subject to internment. Engle, supra note
123, at 83.
208. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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applied the higher "strict scrutiny" standard,20 9 it nonetheless upheld the
constitutionality of Executive Order 9066.2 o
Even during the Cold War era, the political branches continued to
create laws targeted at particular nationalities for scrutiny based on
national security. In response to the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis, the INS
promulgated a regulation that required students from Iran to report to
INS in order to "provide information as to residence and maintenance of
nonimmigrant status" or else be subject to deportation.21 1 When the
regulation was challenged on constitutional grounds, the D.C. Court of
Appeals recognized that classifications based on nationality are
consistent with due process and equal protection so long as they are not
"wholly irrational."212 The court upheld the regulation and concluded:
For reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for regulating
the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has
been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government.
Since decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with
foreign powers, and since a wide variety of classifications must be
defined in the light of changing political and economic
circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a character more
appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than to the
Judiciary. This very case illustrates the need for flexibility in policy
209. Under Equal Protection doctrines courts first determine the level (rational,
intermediate, or strict) of scrutiny required before deciding whether a particular
classification made by the state sufficiently relate to the government's objective.
Traditionally, the courts have applied a heightened level of scrutiny to classifications
based on race, sex national origin, alienage, and legitimacy. See Kenji Yoshino,
Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell, " 108 YALE L.J. 485 (1999).
210. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 222-23 (notably, Korematsu has never been explicitly
overturned); there is a rich body of scholarship analogizing the policies faced by Japanese
and Japanese Americans in the wake of the Pearl Harbor bombing to the ones faced by
Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians in the wake of 9/11. By the same token, some
scholars and judges have challenged the analogy made between the post 9/11 detentions
and profiling and the internment of the Japanese, because the latter incident was "more"
restrictive and discriminatory than the former. Nevertheless, the selective profiling and
imprisonment based on religion, nationality, and national origin that both groups shared
are similar in substance and no more justifiable. As described by one scholar: "[t]hat the
form of the discrimination may seem less invidious, however, does not deflect from the
fact that profiling"-considering individuals suspicious on the basis of religion and not
on a single iota of evidence-"is discriminatory in substance. Profiling in the post-9/11
may not seem as unfavorable as other practices, but this comparison does not change the
nature of profiling from a discriminatory to non-discriminatory." Sidhu, supra note 102,
at 72.
211. Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F. 2d 745, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
212. Id. at 747 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citing Mathews.v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1970),
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977)).
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choices rather than the rigidity often characteristic of constitutional
adjudication .... 213
The court went on to say that the consequences of the registration
requirement "is a judgment to be made by the President and it is not for
us to overrule him, in the absence of acts that are clearly in excess of his
authority." 2 14
The standard for selective enforcement claims was heightened in
1999 with the Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee (Reno).215 Reno involved eight noncitizens
who alleged they were targeted for deportation on the basis of their
national origin and political support for the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).216  Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia asserted the Executive Branch's broad discretion to determine
whom to prosecute, and its incompatibility with judicial review.2 17
Scalia highlights the foreign policy and intelligence-related reasons for
shielding decisions by the immigration agency from outside review. In
an unforgettable passage of the opinion, Scalia notes:
The Executive should not have to disclose its "real" reasons for
deeming nationals of a particular country a special threat-or indeed
for simply wishing to antagonize a particular foreign country by
focusing on that country's nationals-and even if it did disclose them
a court would be ill equipped to determine their authenticity and
utterly unable to assess their adequacy.218
Notably, Justice Scalia also cites to early decisions by the Court to
rationalize selective enforcement in deportation cases. Specially, he held
that unlike a criminal prosecution where the consequences can lead to
punishment, deportation is not the same as punishment and is merely an
effort by the government to terminate "an ongoing violation" of the
United States immigration laws. Justice Scalia remarked, "[t]he
contention that a violation must be allowed to continue because it has
been improperly selected is not powerfully appealing." 2 19
In the same way that Twombly and Iqbal have been criticized for
creating an unachievable pleading standard that gives government
officials a free pass, Reno created an unachievable standard for selective
prosecution cases. Justice Scalia stated: "[t]o resolve the present
213. Id. at 748.
214. Id.
215. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
216. Id. at 473.
217. Id. at 489-90.
218. Id. at 491.
219. Id.
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controversy, we need not rule out the possibility of a rare case in which
the alleged basis of discrimination is so outrageous that the foregoing
considerations can be overcome."2 2 0  "Although 'outrageous' is not a
self-defining term, a few things the Court did not consider to be
outrageous are apparent: '[d]eeming nationals of a particular country a
special threat ... [and] antagoniz[ing] a particular foreign country by
focusing [enforcement efforts] on that country's nationals. ... 221
Numerous cases claiming selective enforcement by the immigration
agency after 9/11 have been rejected based on Reno's "outrageousness"
standard. Notably, a number of these cases involve challenges to agency
policies as "national security" measures after September 11, 2001.222 For
example, many federal judges have relied on the Reno standard to
dismiss or deny several lawsuits filed around the NSEERS program.22 3
In 2002, a federal district court in California dismissed a complaint
alleging the unlawful arrests of individual participants of the "call-in
registration" process.224 Finally Sameer Ashar provides a chilling
account of an "outrageous discrimination" claim brought on behalf of his
client, a fifty-eight year old Pakistani man who was detained at Passaic
County Jail after an interrogation by INS.225 As described by Ashar:
There appeared to be no discernable reason for the arrest of my
client, other than the fact that he was brown-skinned, Muslim, and
present at the Brooklyn mosque on the morning of the INS sweep
.... [O]ur argument was that the government had engaged in
"outrageous" discrimination on the basis of race and religion, in
220. Id. at 491.
221. Id.
222. But see Aldana, supra note 102, at 24, contending that the Attorney General
lacked the inherent executive powers to promulgate regulations altering detention and
due process standards for foreign nationals after 9/11. Specifically, Aldana argues that
"because the Attorney General's issuance of September 11 regulations without
congressional mandate, usurps the 'lawmaking' function entrusted by the Constitution to
Congress, it violates separation of powers . . . ." Id. Following this theory, Aldana
distinguishes the Korematsu case (which involved a congressional declaration and
congressionally authorized executive order to intern Japanese and Japanese Americans)
from the 9/11 detentions that were preceded by no such authorization by Congress. Id.
223. See, e.g., Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 74 (1st Cir. 2006) ("To be sure,
Moroccan nationals were required to register with DHS while a person in the same
situation but not from one of the NSEERS countries would not have been placed in
removal proceedings. However, a claim of selective enforcement based on national
origin is virtually precluded by Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee"); see also Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427 (2d Cir. 2008).
224. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Ashcroft, 241 F. Supp. 2d I111 (C.D.
Cal. 2003).
225. Sameer M. Ashar, Symposium, Immigration Enforcement and Subordination:
The Consequences ofRacial Profiling After September 11, 34 CoNN. L. REv. 1185, 1187-
89(2002).
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targeting the mosque at which my client stayed, and then questioning
and arresting him.
The immigration judge threw out the case, indicating that she would not
allow Ashar and his client "to drag INS officials into her courtroom to
explain their enforcement policies." 2 27 While Ashar points to a handful
of federal court decisions in support of the procedural due process rights
of noncitizens, he laments: "Even armed with a few favorable decisions
on procedural rights, immigrant detainees would likely be unable to
defeat the presumption that the INS may use race and national origin to
selectively enforce and detain." 22 8
Reno's ability to silence many valid claims of discrimination by
foreign nationals has been remarkable. In the aforementioned
companion case to Iqbal, Turkmen v. Ashcroft, United States District
Court Judge John Gleeson relied on Reno to reject the plaintiffs
selective enforcement claims based on race and religion, concluding that
the government's decision to impose greater scrutiny to those who
violated their visa, based on national origin and race, and prolong their
detention during the investigation "was not so irrational or outrageous as
to warrant judicial intrusion into an area in which courts have little
experience and less expertise."2 2 9 Similarly, in affirming Judge
Gleeson's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims about prolonged detention,
the Second Circuit cited to Reno. "Similarly, plaintiffs point to no
authority clearly establishing an equal protection right to be free of
selective enforcement of the immigration laws based on national origin,
race, or religion at the time of plaintiffs' detentions."230
The foregoing body of court challenges indicates that in most cases,
measures that profile foreign nationals on the basis of race, ethnicity,
religion, national origin, nationality, or political ideology will be upheld.
Perhaps this is no different from Kang's sentiments on internment and
9/11 when he states:
[W]e should not be surprised if courts determine that national
security in the face of terrorism is-in the lingo of constitutional
226. Id. at 1188-89.
227. Id. at 1189.
228. Id. (citing Motomura, supra note 199, at 600-13).
229. Turlonen v. Ashcroft, No. 02-2307, at 79 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006).
230. Posting of Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 06-3745 to http://blogs.findlaw.com/
secondcircuit/2009/12/turkmen-v-ashcroft-no-06-3745.html (Dec. 21, 2009, 15:59
EST); but see Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 175 (2d Cir. 2007) (determining that Reno
"does not stand for the proposition that the Government may subject members of a
particular race, ethnicity, or religion to more restrictive conditions of confinement than
members of other races, ethnic backgrounds, or religions") (rev'd on other grounds and
remanded, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937).
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law-a "compelling interest" and that crude forms of racial profiling,
notwithstanding its over and under inclusiveness, are "narrowly
tailored" to furthering that interest. It would be foolish to think that
the courts will necessarily save us from the excesses of the more
political branches. That is another lesson of the internment. This is
all the more reason to demand that our political leaders publicly make
the cost-benefit and moral case in favor of racial profiling before they
adopt any such practice.231
Similarly, Kevin Johnson offers advice on the government's role in
protecting racial minorities during times of emergency:
As a nation, we must be careful in times of severe national stress. In
such times, as history has shown time and time again, the nation has
acted aggressively, but mistakenly, frequently punishing minorities-
in no small part because that tack was feasible politically and
legally-in ways that we as a society later regret. Years from now,
we may look back on the days after September 11, 2001 in a way that
we look today at the Alien and Sedition Acts, the Chinese Exclusion
laws, the Palmer Raids, and Japanese internment, the McCarthy era,
and surveillance of Martin Luther King Jr. and other civil rights
activists in the 1960s. For that reason, we should pause and be
vigilant in an attempt to avoid acting rashly at cross-purposes with
our true goal of protecting the nation and its values. We all should be
vigilant in evaluating the impacts on civil rights of national policies
implemented in the name of national security, especially when the
rights being infringed are those of a discrete and insular minority.
Importantly, a system of laws and judicial review is a most essential
safeguard during these difficult times.232
VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations focus on policy changes and legal
modifications at the Executive and Legislative branch levels. The goals
of these recommendations include, but are not limited to 1) repealing
9/11 policies that had a disproportionate impact on nationals from
Muslim-majority countries; 2) requiring greater oversight of such
policies in order to determine whether the government is justified in
creating or sustaining such policies; and 3) codifying that racial and
religious profiling is unacceptable even during times of national
emergency. Recommendations to the judiciary fall last and reflect the
author's belief that the power of the plenary doctrine makes it difficult to
rely on the courts to reverse national security policies created by the
231. Kang, supra note 189, at 200.
232. Johnson, Lecture, supra note 102, at 25-26.
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political branches that discriminate against individuals and groups.
Instead, consideration must be given to arming the government's own
watchdogs with greater ability to require the government to justify the
value of its policies and modifying the law to afford noncitizens and
minorities basic safeguards during times of emergency.
A. Executive Branch
1. Modify DOJ Guidance on Racial Profiling
DOJ should consider amending their 2003 DOJ Guidance on racial
and ethnic profiling. The Guidance should be binding on all DOJ
personnel. Similarly, the Guidance should include nationality23 3,
national origin, religion, and political ideology (in addition to race and
ethnic profiling) as factors that are generally prohibited from being used
as a law enforcement tool. Moreover, until immigration policy and law
is sufficiently disaggregated from national security programs, the 2003
DOJ Guidance should remove the broad exceptions created for national
security and border security.
2. Repeal DOJ/DHS Regulations on Special Registration
DHS should repeal the regulations relating to special registration,
and ensure that individuals impacted by the program are able to apply for
and receive immigration benefits if they are otherwise eligible and also
apply for legalization if they are otherwise qualified. In the interim,
DHS should ensure that prosecutorial discretion is exercised favorably
toward affected individuals with strong equities such as family ties,
employment, or community ties in the United States. The
Administration should reject screening and tracking programs that
selectively discriminate against groups based on race, religion, ethnicity,
nationality, national origin, or political ideology as a means for
preserving national security or as an immigration enforcement tool.
3. Repeal EOIR Memo on Closed Hearings
DOJ's Executive Office for Immigration Review should repeal the
"Creppy Memo" permitting closed immigration hearings. The
government should adopt legislation or regulations that require
immigration proceedings to be public and closed on a case-by-case basis,
233. While profiling based on nationality may not be inherently objectionable, the
practical impact is offensive and often discriminatory. See e.g., Legomsky, supra note
61, at 185; ASIAN L. CAUCUS & STAN. L. IMMIGRANTS' RTs. CLINIC, supra note 141, at
30-31.
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only if the government can provide compelling evidence that a portion or
the entirety of a hearing should be closed.234
4. Amend DOJ/DHS Regulations on Custody Determinations
DHS should modify the current regulations related to custody
determinations. Specifically, the agency should adopt a "48 hour" rule
for charging noncitizens detained by an immigration officer or agent
deputized to perform immigration functions. Similarly, DHS should be
required to serve a Notice to Appear on the noncitizen and file the NTA
with the immigration court within 72 hours. Any individual held in
immigration custody beyond these specified timeframes should be
immediately placed before an immigration judge. An immigration judge
should determine whether prolonged detention without charges, service
of charges, or filing of such charges is appropriate. This determination
should be made on the record.
5. Create Greater Mechanisms for Accountability and Oversight
The Administration should create greater mechanisms for
accountability and oversight of agency programs that disproportionately
target individuals based on race, religion, ethnicity, national origin,
nationality, or political ideology. The impact and national security value
of the AAI, NSEERS program, and the Creppy Memo should be audited.
Programs that lack a legitimate purpose must sunset within a prescribed
time period or be eliminated altogether. On an annual basis, the
Inspector General office or related watchdog of the agency at which the
program operates should audit such programs. Such audits should be
publicly available, and include recommendations about whether to
continue, modify or terminate a particular program.
B. Legislative Branch
1. Greater Congressional Oversight
Congress should engage in greater oversight on Executive branch
activity and policymaking. As described by Senator Patrick Leahy at an
oversight hearing following 9/11:
[t]he need for congressional oversight and vigilance is not, as some
mistakenly describe it, "to protect terrorists"-it is to protect
ourselves and our freedoms, something in which each and every
234. For an example of related legislative language, see Civil Liberties Restoration
Act of 2005, H.R. 1502, 109th Cong. (2005).
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American has a stake. It is to make sure that we keep in sight at all
times the line that separates tremendous government power on the
one hand and the rights and liberties of all Americans on the other.235
Congressional oversight hearings should be regularly scheduled to
address not only the national security implications of past and future
terrorist events, but also to address the scope and appropriateness of
profiling policies created in the name of national security.
2. Enact End Racial Profiling Act
Congress should enact the End Racial Profiling Act. Introduced
numerous times in the House and Senate, the End Racial Profiling Act
(ERPA) defines racial profiling as "the practice of a law enforcement
agent or agency relying, to any degree, on race, ethnicity, national origin,
or religion in selecting which individual to subject to routine or
,,236spontaneous investigatory activities. ERPA has also noted the
deficiencies in the 2003 DOJ Racial Profiling Guidance and
acknowledges that
[i]n the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, many
Arabs, Muslims, Central and South Asians, and Sikhs, as well as
other immigrants and Americans of foreign descent, were treated
with generalized suspicion and subjected to searches and seizures
based upon religion and national origin, without trustworthy
information linking specific individuals to criminal conduct. Such
profiling has failed to produce tangible benefits, yet has created a fear
and mistrust of law enforcement agencies in these communities.237
C. Judiciary
The courts can and should play a greater role in scrutinizing actions
taken by the Executive Branch. While the courts have long concluded
that matters of foreign affairs and national security are best left to the
235. Marie A. Taylor, Immigration Enforcement Post-September 11: Safeguarding
the Civil Rights of Middle Eastern-American and Immigrant Communities, 17 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 63, 104 (2002) (citing DOJ, Oversight Hearing, Dec. 6, 2001, opening
statement of Sen. Leahy).
236. End Racial Profiling Act of 2007, S. 2481 110th Cong. (2007); see also Senator
Russ Feingold, Fact Sheet on End of Racial Profiling Act,
http://feingold.senate.gov/issues-profilingfacts.html. Co-sponsors in 2007 included, Sen.
Sherrod Brown (OH), Sen. Maria Cantwell (WA), Sen. Benjamin L. Cardin (MD), Sen.
Hillary Rodham Clinton (NY), Sen. Christopher J. Dodd (CT), Sen. Richard Durbin (IL),
Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (MA), Sen. John F. Kerry (MA), Sen. Frank R. Lautenberg
(NJ), Sen. Robert Menendez (NJ), Sen. Barbara A. Mikulski (MD), Sen. Barack Obama
(IL), and Sen. Debbie Stabenow (MI).
237. End Racial Profiling Act of 2007, S. 2481 110th Cong. (2007).
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"political branches" of government, courts must still scrutinize Executive
Branch actions that are contrary to checks and balances, without
congressional authorization, or inconsistent with common
understandings of checks and balances.2 38
The greatest problem with the Business As Usual Standard is that
many of the 9/11 immigration policies were employed with little national
security benefit and were discriminatory. The foregoing
recommendations will not lead to an overnight change in a legal and
social culture that permits "Business as Usual," but they do offer some
potentially tangible benefits. First, rolling back the national security and
immigration policies that disproportionately impact Arabs, Muslims and
South Asian communities will reduce the profiling and substantial harms
suffered by such communities. Second, including greater oversight
mechanisms will enable the government to utilize its own ombudsmen to
ensure that national security policies are effective and balanced against
the potential harms. Third, enacting anti-profiling legislation will limit
the extent to which national security can serve as a proxy for
immigration policy that discriminates against particular communities.
Even with the most deferential judges, the foregoing changes can
potentially result in a culture of deference to a more reasonable and less
discriminatory set of laws.
238. Aldana, supra note 102, at 40.
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